That’s how I meant ought, given a consequentialist view along the lines of Singer’s Famine Affluence, and Morality or Shelly Kagan’s The Limits of Morality. I’m not sure the uncertainty problem is unique to this form of action—if the evidence for this action is speculative or uncertain, then that makes the opportunity cost for the alternatives uncertain. Uncertainty is infectious, and I don’t think that undoes our moral commitments.
I think you interpreted my parent comment as saying:
Even though the expected benefits of protesting may be high, I think the case is too uncertain and therefore shouldn’t be an obligation.
That’s not what I meant; sorry if I wasn’t clear. I meant that you haven’t provided enough evidence to move my prior on participating in protests from “not very effective” to “very effective”.
That’s how I meant ought, given a consequentialist view along the lines of Singer’s Famine Affluence, and Morality or Shelly Kagan’s The Limits of Morality. I’m not sure the uncertainty problem is unique to this form of action—if the evidence for this action is speculative or uncertain, then that makes the opportunity cost for the alternatives uncertain. Uncertainty is infectious, and I don’t think that undoes our moral commitments.
I think you interpreted my parent comment as saying:
That’s not what I meant; sorry if I wasn’t clear. I meant that you haven’t provided enough evidence to move my prior on participating in protests from “not very effective” to “very effective”.