Ah, youâre right, Becksteadâs guidelines are mentioned.
This does still seem a bit asymmetric as a trade: in exchange for grant money and discussing outcomes and problems, i.e. flawed futures and s-risks, that both classical utilitarians (or those with more symmetric views) and those with suffering-focused views would view as astronomically bad, EAF/âFRI is expected to emphasize moral uncertainty, reference arguments against asymmetric views and for symmetric views and weaken the framing of arguments against symmetric views (e.g. âworld destructionâ). Is this accurate?
In other words, those with more symmetric views should already care about flawed futures and s-risks, so it doesnât seem like much of a compromise for them to mention them, but those with suffering-focused views are expected to undermine their own views.
Are, for example, any of the procreation asymmetry, negative utilitarianism, lexicality, prioritarianism or tranquilism mentioned in Becksteadâs guidelines? What about moral uncertainty in population ethics generally?
I can see how this could be considered a big win for suffering-focused views overall by getting more consideration for their practical concerns (flawed futures and s-risks), and de-emphasizing these views in itself could also be useful to attract hires and donors for s-risk work, but if someone thought the promotion of suffering-focused views (generally, or within EA) was important, it could be seen as an overall loss.
Maybe having two separate orgs actually is the best option, with one (EAF/âFRI) focused on s-risks and emphasizing moral uncertainty, and the other (thereâs been talk about one) emphasizing suffering-focused views.
So you seem to think that our guidelines ask people to weaken their views while Nickâs may not be doing that, and that they may be harmful to suffering-focused views if we think promoting SFE is important. I think my perspective differs in the following ways:
The guidelines are fairly similar in their recommendation to mention moral uncertainty and arguments that are especially important to other parts of the community while representing oneâs own views honestly.
If we want to promote SFE in EA, we will be more convincing for (potential) EAs if we provide nuanced and balanced arguments, which is what the guidelines ask for, and if s-risks research is more fleshed out and established in the community. Unlike our previous SFE content, our recent efforts (e.g., workshops, asking for feedback on early drafts) received a lot of engagement from both newer and long-time EA community members. (Outside of EA, this seems less clear.)
We sought feedback on these guidelines from community members and received largely positive feedback. Some people will always disagree but overall, most people were in favor. Weâll seek out feedback again when we revisit the guidelines.
I think this new form of cooperation across the community is worth trying and improving on. It may not be perfect yet, but we will reassess at the end of this year and make adjustments (or discontinue the guidelines in a worst case).
I hope this is helpful. We have now published the guidelines, you can find the links above!
I agree with/âappreciate these points. I think there is a difference in how each sides deals with each othersâ concerns, but I guess I can see that it might be fair anyway. That is, in EAFâs guidelines, authors are encouraged to âinclude some of the best arguments against these positions, and, if appropriate, mention the wide acceptance of these arguments in the effective altruism communityâ, while in Becksteadâs, authors are encouraged to discuss the practical concerns of the SFE community, which might not otherwise be practical concerns for them, depending on their empirical views (e.g. astronomical suffering would be outweighed by far more wellbeing).
Also, I expect this not to be the case, but is general advocacy against working on extinction risks (and in favour of other priorities) something that would be discouraged according to the guidelines? This may âcause human extinctionâ by causing people to (voluntarily) be less likely to try to prevent extinction. Similarly, what about advocacy for voluntary human extinction (however unlikely it is anyway)? I think these should be fine if done in an honest and civil way, and neither underhandedly nor manipulatively.
Thanks! I think I donât have the capacity to give detailed public replies to this right now. My respective short answers would be something like âsure, that seems fineâ and âmight inspire riskier content, depends a lot on the framing and contextâ, but thereâs nuance to this thatâs hard to convey in half a sentence. If you would like to write something about these topics and are interested in my perspective, feel free to get in touch and Iâm happy to share my thoughts!
Ah, youâre right, Becksteadâs guidelines are mentioned.
This does still seem a bit asymmetric as a trade: in exchange for grant money and discussing outcomes and problems, i.e. flawed futures and s-risks, that both classical utilitarians (or those with more symmetric views) and those with suffering-focused views would view as astronomically bad, EAF/âFRI is expected to emphasize moral uncertainty, reference arguments against asymmetric views and for symmetric views and weaken the framing of arguments against symmetric views (e.g. âworld destructionâ). Is this accurate?
In other words, those with more symmetric views should already care about flawed futures and s-risks, so it doesnât seem like much of a compromise for them to mention them, but those with suffering-focused views are expected to undermine their own views.
Are, for example, any of the procreation asymmetry, negative utilitarianism, lexicality, prioritarianism or tranquilism mentioned in Becksteadâs guidelines? What about moral uncertainty in population ethics generally?
I can see how this could be considered a big win for suffering-focused views overall by getting more consideration for their practical concerns (flawed futures and s-risks), and de-emphasizing these views in itself could also be useful to attract hires and donors for s-risk work, but if someone thought the promotion of suffering-focused views (generally, or within EA) was important, it could be seen as an overall loss.
Maybe having two separate orgs actually is the best option, with one (EAF/âFRI) focused on s-risks and emphasizing moral uncertainty, and the other (thereâs been talk about one) emphasizing suffering-focused views.
Thanks for giving input on this!
So you seem to think that our guidelines ask people to weaken their views while Nickâs may not be doing that, and that they may be harmful to suffering-focused views if we think promoting SFE is important. I think my perspective differs in the following ways:
The guidelines are fairly similar in their recommendation to mention moral uncertainty and arguments that are especially important to other parts of the community while representing oneâs own views honestly.
If we want to promote SFE in EA, we will be more convincing for (potential) EAs if we provide nuanced and balanced arguments, which is what the guidelines ask for, and if s-risks research is more fleshed out and established in the community. Unlike our previous SFE content, our recent efforts (e.g., workshops, asking for feedback on early drafts) received a lot of engagement from both newer and long-time EA community members. (Outside of EA, this seems less clear.)
We sought feedback on these guidelines from community members and received largely positive feedback. Some people will always disagree but overall, most people were in favor. Weâll seek out feedback again when we revisit the guidelines.
I think this new form of cooperation across the community is worth trying and improving on. It may not be perfect yet, but we will reassess at the end of this year and make adjustments (or discontinue the guidelines in a worst case).
I hope this is helpful. We have now published the guidelines, you can find the links above!
Thanks!
I agree with/âappreciate these points. I think there is a difference in how each sides deals with each othersâ concerns, but I guess I can see that it might be fair anyway. That is, in EAFâs guidelines, authors are encouraged to âinclude some of the best arguments against these positions, and, if appropriate, mention the wide acceptance of these arguments in the effective altruism communityâ, while in Becksteadâs, authors are encouraged to discuss the practical concerns of the SFE community, which might not otherwise be practical concerns for them, depending on their empirical views (e.g. astronomical suffering would be outweighed by far more wellbeing).
Also, I expect this not to be the case, but is general advocacy against working on extinction risks (and in favour of other priorities) something that would be discouraged according to the guidelines? This may âcause human extinctionâ by causing people to (voluntarily) be less likely to try to prevent extinction. Similarly, what about advocacy for voluntary human extinction (however unlikely it is anyway)? I think these should be fine if done in an honest and civil way, and neither underhandedly nor manipulatively.
Thanks! I think I donât have the capacity to give detailed public replies to this right now. My respective short answers would be something like âsure, that seems fineâ and âmight inspire riskier content, depends a lot on the framing and contextâ, but thereâs nuance to this thatâs hard to convey in half a sentence. If you would like to write something about these topics and are interested in my perspective, feel free to get in touch and Iâm happy to share my thoughts!