Would you fund interventions decreasing the number of factory-farmed animals with positive lives? I would not, as they would decrease welfare. For context:
I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free corporate campaigns increase welfare per living time by 92.9 % and 80.4 %, which are not far from the increase of 100 % that would be obtained for improved conditions respecting neutral lives.
Based on Ambitious Impact’s pain intensities, assuming hurtful pain is as intense as a practically maximally happy life, both broilers in a reformed scenario and hens in cage-free aviaries have slightly positive lives.
Thanks for the question. This is not a question the fund has to consider very often—we’re typically evaluating grants that would affect animals living lives we expect are negative lives.
It’s possible there are some cases where we’re evaluating some interventions to reduce the number of farmed animals (e.g., meat reduction or farm prohibitions) where some of the animals who would not come into existence because of the reform would have otherwise lived net positive lives (some have estimated under particular ethical assumptions that cows raised for beef could be living net positive lives), but the vast majority of the impact would still be aiming to affect animals that are experiencing net negative lives and don’t have a viable path on the table to achieve net positive lives instead.
To go a bit more in-depth and offer a more personal take rather than speaking for the AWF. Personally, even if I put on my 100% utilitarian hat, I would still have some uncertainty. First, I would need to have high confidence in:
Their lives being in fact, net positive. I think there is too much uncertainty about the welfare of animals and how to approach it depending on ethical theory. For example, if we give significant credence to negative utilitarianism or simply place a high weight on excruciating pain, then even if animals lead decent lives, slaughter at the end of their lives may outweigh it.
Methods to measure and aggregate their welfare, such as temporal welfare aggregation challenges.
Ability to determine where this threshold is and at which point life becomes net positive. Some claim that this concept is not even valid.
But yeah, if I was confident in all of that, or was risk permissive, with a 100% specific flavor of utilitarianism hat on, maybe I would.
But personally, I’m not sure I’m 100% utilitarian, and I have a more complex parliament, where some members/​ethical theories say that it wouldn’t be ethical (e.g., rights-based). I could imagine a case where more members would agree if, for example, there was no slaughter before natural death would occur for a given individual, and animals would die being completely anesthetized. Additionally, farms would be completely open, where an animal could choose to leave the environment they are in (where they are taken care of, but their products are taken away from them) and choose another one (where perhaps they are not taken care of but are free to fully express their natural behavior (e.g., where their offspring would hatch from eggs instead of eggs being taken away from them)). There are still dilemmas, such as whether truly informed consent is possible for animals, whether the choice to stay implies positive welfare or just status quo bias, and whether providing choice is sufficient for moral permissibility, etc.
Then there is also the issue of whether we are obligated to bring into life beings who will lead net positive lives. I certainly don’t act in accordance with that now, and I think population ethics is something I cannot solve, so I don’t know what I would do. ¯\(ツ)/​¯ Jokingly, maybe spend my donation budget to fund Peter Singer to figure it out :P
Are you effectively assuming that when they are awake and not experiencing hurtful pain or worse, that they are experiencing pleasure as intense as hurtful pain? I would probably assume only pleasure that intense for eating, dustbathing and playing, at most. Foraging might be annoying or hurtful intensity.
Thanks for the question, Michael! Yes, roughly so. With the caveat that pleasure and hurtful pain can be experienced simulataneously, in which case the positive experiences may be less intense (holding the total welfare from positive experiences costant) than hurtful pain (because they could be experienced for longer).
I set the welfare from pleasure to the product between:
The lifetime minus 8 h/​d of null welfare minus the sum of the time in hurtful, disabling and excruciating pain.
The intensity of hurtful pain.
This is based on my guess that the pleasure during the non-neutral time outside that in hurtful, disabling or excruciating pain is as intense as a practically maximally happy life, which I assume to be as intense as hurtful pain.
Ideally, the Welfare Footprint Project would measure the cumulative time in each of their 4 categories of pleasure, and then one could determine the welfare from pleasure by guessing their intensity as a fraction of that of a practically maximally happy life (as I did for pain in my post).
Would you fund interventions decreasing the number of factory-farmed animals with positive lives? I would not, as they would decrease welfare. For context:
I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free corporate campaigns increase welfare per living time by 92.9 % and 80.4 %, which are not far from the increase of 100 % that would be obtained for improved conditions respecting neutral lives.
Based on Ambitious Impact’s pain intensities, assuming hurtful pain is as intense as a practically maximally happy life, both broilers in a reformed scenario and hens in cage-free aviaries have slightly positive lives.
Thanks for the question. This is not a question the fund has to consider very often—we’re typically evaluating grants that would affect animals living lives we expect are negative lives.
It’s possible there are some cases where we’re evaluating some interventions to reduce the number of farmed animals (e.g., meat reduction or farm prohibitions) where some of the animals who would not come into existence because of the reform would have otherwise lived net positive lives (some have estimated under particular ethical assumptions that cows raised for beef could be living net positive lives), but the vast majority of the impact would still be aiming to affect animals that are experiencing net negative lives and don’t have a viable path on the table to achieve net positive lives instead.
To go a bit more in-depth and offer a more personal take rather than speaking for the AWF. Personally, even if I put on my 100% utilitarian hat, I would still have some uncertainty. First, I would need to have high confidence in:
Their lives being in fact, net positive. I think there is too much uncertainty about the welfare of animals and how to approach it depending on ethical theory. For example, if we give significant credence to negative utilitarianism or simply place a high weight on excruciating pain, then even if animals lead decent lives, slaughter at the end of their lives may outweigh it.
Methods to measure and aggregate their welfare, such as temporal welfare aggregation challenges.
Ability to determine where this threshold is and at which point life becomes net positive. Some claim that this concept is not even valid.
But yeah, if I was confident in all of that, or was risk permissive, with a 100% specific flavor of utilitarianism hat on, maybe I would.
But personally, I’m not sure I’m 100% utilitarian, and I have a more complex parliament, where some members/​ethical theories say that it wouldn’t be ethical (e.g., rights-based). I could imagine a case where more members would agree if, for example, there was no slaughter before natural death would occur for a given individual, and animals would die being completely anesthetized. Additionally, farms would be completely open, where an animal could choose to leave the environment they are in (where they are taken care of, but their products are taken away from them) and choose another one (where perhaps they are not taken care of but are free to fully express their natural behavior (e.g., where their offspring would hatch from eggs instead of eggs being taken away from them)). There are still dilemmas, such as whether truly informed consent is possible for animals, whether the choice to stay implies positive welfare or just status quo bias, and whether providing choice is sufficient for moral permissibility, etc.
Then there is also the issue of whether we are obligated to bring into life beings who will lead net positive lives. I certainly don’t act in accordance with that now, and I think population ethics is something I cannot solve, so I don’t know what I would do. ¯\(ツ)/​¯ Jokingly, maybe spend my donation budget to fund Peter Singer to figure it out :P
Thanks, Karolina! It is great to know your thoughts on this and my other questions.
Are you effectively assuming that when they are awake and not experiencing hurtful pain or worse, that they are experiencing pleasure as intense as hurtful pain? I would probably assume only pleasure that intense for eating, dustbathing and playing, at most. Foraging might be annoying or hurtful intensity.
Thanks for the question, Michael! Yes, roughly so. With the caveat that pleasure and hurtful pain can be experienced simulataneously, in which case the positive experiences may be less intense (holding the total welfare from positive experiences costant) than hurtful pain (because they could be experienced for longer).
This is based on my guess that the pleasure during the non-neutral time outside that in hurtful, disabling or excruciating pain is as intense as a practically maximally happy life, which I assume to be as intense as hurtful pain.
Ideally, the Welfare Footprint Project would measure the cumulative time in each of their 4 categories of pleasure, and then one could determine the welfare from pleasure by guessing their intensity as a fraction of that of a practically maximally happy life (as I did for pain in my post).