In Magnus’s post, Will MacAskill makes the claim that:
“If we think it’s bad to bring into existence a life of suffering, why should we not think that it’s good to bring into existence a flourishing life? I think any argument for the first claim would also be a good argument for the second.”
Magnus presents the asymmetry as an example of a view that offers an argument for the first claim but not for the second claim.
I agree that someone can just say they disagree with the asymmetry and many people do—it think of it as a terminal belief that doesn’t have “underlying” justification, similar to views like “suffering is bad”.
(Is there a proper philosophy term for what I’m calling a “terminal belief”?)
In Magnus’s post, Will MacAskill makes the claim that:
“If we think it’s bad to bring into existence a life of suffering, why should we not think that it’s good to bring into existence a flourishing life? I think any argument for the first claim would also be a good argument for the second.”
Magnus presents the asymmetry as an example of a view that offers an argument for the first claim but not for the second claim.
I agree that someone can just say they disagree with the asymmetry and many people do—it think of it as a terminal belief that doesn’t have “underlying” justification, similar to views like “suffering is bad”.
(Is there a proper philosophy term for what I’m calling a “terminal belief”?)
What is the reasoning that the asymmetry uses to argue for the first claim? This isn’t currently clear to me.
I suspect whatever the reasoning is that it can also be used to argue for the second claim.
See my comment here.