Hereâs another way of saying my objection to your original comment: What makes âhappiness is intrinsically goodâ more of an axiom than âsufficiently intense suffering is morally serious in a sense that happiness (of the sort that doesnât relieve any suffering) isnât, so the latter canât compensate for the formerâ? I donât see what answer you can give that doesnât appeal to intuitions about cases.
Hereâs another way of saying my objection to your original comment: What makes âhappiness is intrinsically goodâ more of an axiom than âsufficiently intense suffering is morally serious in a sense that happiness (of the sort that doesnât relieve any suffering) isnât, so the latter canât compensate for the formerâ? I donât see what answer you can give that doesnât appeal to intuitions about cases.