Far-future effects are the most important determinant of what we ought to do
The argument for strong longtermism as I understand it seems structurally identical to Pascal’s mugging. (There is some small chance that the value of the future is enormous, therefore reducing extinction risk today has enormous value).
It frustrates me that I can’t explain exactly what is wrong with this argument, but I am sceptical of it for the same reason that I wouldn’t hand over my wallet to a Pascal mugger.
The argument for strong longtermism as I understand it seems structurally identical to Pascal’s mugging. (There is some small chance that the value of the future is enormous, therefore reducing extinction risk today has enormous value).
It frustrates me that I can’t explain exactly what is wrong with this argument, but I am sceptical of it for the same reason that I wouldn’t hand over my wallet to a Pascal mugger.