This is an extremely well-structured and quite comprehensive take on the controversy and if a person fresh to the issue were to read just one article on the topic, this would be one of the best candidates. It is also the first LAWS piece I encountered in months that expanded on the previous discussions rather than just rehashing them. This is ready to be published in a scientific journal at a minimal cost of adding some references and editing the text to fit their preferences, and I heartily encourage you to submit it asap.
Regarding the substance – the section on responsibility is spot on, and the discussion of the sense of justice is the best and most tacit treatment of the topic I’ve seen. Same for most of your treatment of the moral hazard in favor of conflict. However, as you explicitly rely on the premise that Western interventions are on average good, this argument is a non-starter in the academic, political and media circles that most prominently call for a ban. I have long suspected that the real motivation for the relative ferocity of the opposition is the mistaken diagnosis that the US military and its allies are the most disruptive and destructive force on the planet, a force with neo-colonial motivations and goals. The criminal incompetence and callous conduct of many such campaigns lends plausibility to that view, and therefore I usually strengthen this particular argument by pointing to a unique opportunity for remodeling the Western armed forces to better fit the human rights paradigm – and opportunity offered by automatization of frontline combat. It is not just about reducing direct civilian casualties by increasing precision, lessening force protection or preventing atrocities – it is about re-orienting the human military professionals from delivery of force to effective conflict resolution, letting them focus on the soft jobs and strict supervision as LAWs do the lifting, marching and shooting.
(On the margins – comparing the cost of killing and ISIS fighter versus domestic interventions and calling it “cost-effective” appears heartless even within the community of committed utilitarians, let alone outside it. Not to mention that measuring the effectiveness of a military intervention by body count is highly misleading.)
You are more than right to shift focus to the issue of LAWs-enabled authoritarian abuses and societal control over the military and government. However, you seem to significantly underestimate the price of the authoritarians (and terrorists) getting their hands on such technology. The much higher incidence of abuse would not be offset by the greater stability of otherwise decent governments, partially because decent-but-weak governments will not be able to afford such technology in sufficient quantity, and partially because such governments are violently rebelled against at a much lower rate than parasitic or tyrannical regimes. Jihadism is currently the only ideology that foments significant unrest not connected with abuse or abject poverty, and even jihadism usually rides the coattails of other grievances, like in Syria, Iraq or Libya. There is no doubt in my mind that stopping even a portion of the worlds autocrats from acquiring LAWs is a goal worthy of very significant investments – I just do not think it can ever be achieved by declaring unilateral robot disarmament. In fact one of the most potent arguments for developing well-behaved, hacking-proof LAWs is their unique ability to stop rogue LAWs to be inevitably developed by such rogue actors.
The illustration of the algorithmic nature of the human-based modern military machine is again the most succinct yet accurate I have encountered in the literature.
In conclusion, while I generally agree with 95% of the points you are making and applaud your focus on the domestic control issue and the stress you put on the generally beneficial character of the Western military influence, I believe you do not go far enough in examining the detrimental potential of LAWs in wrong hands and therefore of the abdication of this technology by the West. I believe that both the benefits of handling the new Revolution in Military Affairs well and the costs of mishandling it are larger than you appear to estimate.
Thank you for the comment. I will make some changes based on your comment and see about getting it published.
However, as you explicitly rely on the premise that Western interventions are on average good, this argument is a non-starter in the academic, political and media circles that most prominently call for a ban.
I said that stability operations (which do not include the initial invasions of Iraq/Afghanistan and the strikes on Libya) are good at least half the time. I think this is shared by the majority of think tankers, politicians, and academics concerned with foreign policy, though of course the most prominent anti-LAW activists will probably be a different story.
it is about re-orienting the human military professionals from delivery of force to effective conflict resolution, letting them focus on the soft jobs and strict supervision as LAWs do the lifting, marching and shooting.
I don’t think this is a serious benefit. Reducing the manpower requirements for firepower and maneuvering does not increase the competence and number of people in other sectors. People in non-force and non-military roles require different qualifications, they cannot be simply recruited from regular soldiers. This is like saying that a car company which automates its production line will now be able to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles.
(On the margins – comparing the cost of killing and ISIS fighter versus domestic interventions and calling it “cost-effective” appears heartless even within the community of committed utilitarians, let alone outside it.
Not sure exactly what your argument is, but desiring the death of active ISIS combatants is a quite popular and common-sense view. Especially among most non-utilitarians, who frequently disregard the welfare of immoral people, whereas utilitarians are more likely to be sympathetic to the personal interests of even ISIS combatants.
Not to mention that measuring the effectiveness of a military intervention by body count is highly misleading.)
Just because it’s rough doesn’t mean it’s misleading. Of course there is complexity and uncertainty to the matter. The accurate comparison is the typical cost of averting a death vs the cost of averting a foreign death from insurgency or terrorism. Getting there would require some assumptions about the average harm posed by an average combatant and similar issues, on which I don’t have any data. But based on the figures I provided, it seems like an intuitively persuasive comparison. I can however add a few more lines explicating the uncertainty.
The much higher incidence of abuse would not be offset by the greater stability of otherwise decent governments, partially because decent-but-weak governments will not be able to afford such technology in sufficient quantity, and partially because such governments are violently rebelled against at a much lower rate than parasitic or tyrannical regimes.
Hmm. I can think of lots of examples of flawed democracies facing recent internal unrest. E.g.: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Nigeria, India, the Philippines, Thailand, Ukraine, and Georgia.
I think your classification is odd here, contrasting decent-but-weak governments with tyrannical ones. What about bad-but-weak governments? Won’t they similarly be unable to afford advanced LAW technology?
This would benefit from a clearer formalization of state types, which I will think about using.
Jihadism is currently the only ideology that foments significant unrest not connected with abuse or abject poverty,
I don’t think so. See: populism, socialism, ethno-separatism (though your definition of ‘abuse’ is maybe doing a lot of work here). But I’m not sure what your point is here.
However you have made me realize that liberal states are less likely to use LAWs for internal policing, for political reasons, so the increase in state stability does indeed appear likely to disproportionately accrue to bad regimes.
This is an extremely well-structured and quite comprehensive take on the controversy and if a person fresh to the issue were to read just one article on the topic, this would be one of the best candidates. It is also the first LAWS piece I encountered in months that expanded on the previous discussions rather than just rehashing them. This is ready to be published in a scientific journal at a minimal cost of adding some references and editing the text to fit their preferences, and I heartily encourage you to submit it asap.
Regarding the substance – the section on responsibility is spot on, and the discussion of the sense of justice is the best and most tacit treatment of the topic I’ve seen. Same for most of your treatment of the moral hazard in favor of conflict. However, as you explicitly rely on the premise that Western interventions are on average good, this argument is a non-starter in the academic, political and media circles that most prominently call for a ban. I have long suspected that the real motivation for the relative ferocity of the opposition is the mistaken diagnosis that the US military and its allies are the most disruptive and destructive force on the planet, a force with neo-colonial motivations and goals. The criminal incompetence and callous conduct of many such campaigns lends plausibility to that view, and therefore I usually strengthen this particular argument by pointing to a unique opportunity for remodeling the Western armed forces to better fit the human rights paradigm – and opportunity offered by automatization of frontline combat. It is not just about reducing direct civilian casualties by increasing precision, lessening force protection or preventing atrocities – it is about re-orienting the human military professionals from delivery of force to effective conflict resolution, letting them focus on the soft jobs and strict supervision as LAWs do the lifting, marching and shooting.
(On the margins – comparing the cost of killing and ISIS fighter versus domestic interventions and calling it “cost-effective” appears heartless even within the community of committed utilitarians, let alone outside it. Not to mention that measuring the effectiveness of a military intervention by body count is highly misleading.)
You are more than right to shift focus to the issue of LAWs-enabled authoritarian abuses and societal control over the military and government. However, you seem to significantly underestimate the price of the authoritarians (and terrorists) getting their hands on such technology. The much higher incidence of abuse would not be offset by the greater stability of otherwise decent governments, partially because decent-but-weak governments will not be able to afford such technology in sufficient quantity, and partially because such governments are violently rebelled against at a much lower rate than parasitic or tyrannical regimes. Jihadism is currently the only ideology that foments significant unrest not connected with abuse or abject poverty, and even jihadism usually rides the coattails of other grievances, like in Syria, Iraq or Libya. There is no doubt in my mind that stopping even a portion of the worlds autocrats from acquiring LAWs is a goal worthy of very significant investments – I just do not think it can ever be achieved by declaring unilateral robot disarmament. In fact one of the most potent arguments for developing well-behaved, hacking-proof LAWs is their unique ability to stop rogue LAWs to be inevitably developed by such rogue actors.
The illustration of the algorithmic nature of the human-based modern military machine is again the most succinct yet accurate I have encountered in the literature.
In conclusion, while I generally agree with 95% of the points you are making and applaud your focus on the domestic control issue and the stress you put on the generally beneficial character of the Western military influence, I believe you do not go far enough in examining the detrimental potential of LAWs in wrong hands and therefore of the abdication of this technology by the West. I believe that both the benefits of handling the new Revolution in Military Affairs well and the costs of mishandling it are larger than you appear to estimate.
Great job, and again—make sure to publish this!
Thank you for the comment. I will make some changes based on your comment and see about getting it published.
I said that stability operations (which do not include the initial invasions of Iraq/Afghanistan and the strikes on Libya) are good at least half the time. I think this is shared by the majority of think tankers, politicians, and academics concerned with foreign policy, though of course the most prominent anti-LAW activists will probably be a different story.
I don’t think this is a serious benefit. Reducing the manpower requirements for firepower and maneuvering does not increase the competence and number of people in other sectors. People in non-force and non-military roles require different qualifications, they cannot be simply recruited from regular soldiers. This is like saying that a car company which automates its production line will now be able to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles.
Not sure exactly what your argument is, but desiring the death of active ISIS combatants is a quite popular and common-sense view. Especially among most non-utilitarians, who frequently disregard the welfare of immoral people, whereas utilitarians are more likely to be sympathetic to the personal interests of even ISIS combatants.
Just because it’s rough doesn’t mean it’s misleading. Of course there is complexity and uncertainty to the matter. The accurate comparison is the typical cost of averting a death vs the cost of averting a foreign death from insurgency or terrorism. Getting there would require some assumptions about the average harm posed by an average combatant and similar issues, on which I don’t have any data. But based on the figures I provided, it seems like an intuitively persuasive comparison. I can however add a few more lines explicating the uncertainty.
Hmm. I can think of lots of examples of flawed democracies facing recent internal unrest. E.g.: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Nigeria, India, the Philippines, Thailand, Ukraine, and Georgia.
I think your classification is odd here, contrasting decent-but-weak governments with tyrannical ones. What about bad-but-weak governments? Won’t they similarly be unable to afford advanced LAW technology?
This would benefit from a clearer formalization of state types, which I will think about using.
I don’t think so. See: populism, socialism, ethno-separatism (though your definition of ‘abuse’ is maybe doing a lot of work here). But I’m not sure what your point is here.
However you have made me realize that liberal states are less likely to use LAWs for internal policing, for political reasons, so the increase in state stability does indeed appear likely to disproportionately accrue to bad regimes.