Thank you for the feedback on both the arguments and writing (something I am aiming to improve through this writing). Sorry for being slow to respond, it’s been a busy few of weeks!
I don’t think there’s actually any disagreement here except here:
But even as this is stated, I also think that it doesn’t follow. I think, to be a longtermist, you only really need to accept the first of MacAskill’s premises. I think someone who thinks that the future has great moral value, but thinks that they don’t have a clear causal way to ensure/improve that value, would be justified as being a longtermist without be committed to ignore the plight of those in the present for the sake of a possible future.
I disagree, at least taking the MacAskill definition of as “the view that we should be doing much more to protect future generations”. This is not just a moral conclusion but also a conclusion regarding how we should use marginal resources. If you do not think there is a causal way to affect future people, I think you must reject that conclusion.
However, I think sometimes longtermism is used to mean “we should value future people roughly similarly to how we value current people”. Under this definition, I agree with you.
Thank you for the feedback on both the arguments and writing (something I am aiming to improve through this writing). Sorry for being slow to respond, it’s been a busy few of weeks!
I don’t think there’s actually any disagreement here except here:
I disagree, at least taking the MacAskill definition of as “the view that we should be doing much more to protect future generations”. This is not just a moral conclusion but also a conclusion regarding how we should use marginal resources. If you do not think there is a causal way to affect future people, I think you must reject that conclusion.
However, I think sometimes longtermism is used to mean “we should value future people roughly similarly to how we value current people”. Under this definition, I agree with you.