[Link] Normative Implications of Reductionism about Personal Identity

Article published in the first volume of the philosophy journal Aperto Animo. Available here.

Abstract:

Let Reductionism be the correct account of personal identity. How does that change, or constrain our views in ethical theory? In this paper, I presuppose a popular account of Reductionism, the psychological criterion of personal identity, and explore its implications to ethical theory. First, I argue that this view most plausibly implies the extreme view, according to which the ethically significant metaphysical units are momentary experiences. I then argue that the extreme view appropriately responds to the nonidentity problem via rejecting the person-affecting view. I then defend that the extreme view provides support to utilitarianism. Moreover, the extreme view results in the so-called Repugnant conclusion, which says that for any population with very high welfare, there is a population containing more individuals with lives which are barely worth living whose existence, all else equal, is better. I then defend the extreme view’s plausibility in face of this result.