“As long as you have a non-zero chance of finitenes (even if that chance limits to zero, even if it’s only a chance in a trillion years time) then you can apply a preference ordering for sooner (or closer events).”
Do you mean moral time discounting, so rejecting impartiality (and so Amanda’s permutation principle)?
I haven’t read Amanda’s work so I cannot say for certain but yes this sounds correct. My view would basically equate to moral time discounting. (If you think in a trillion trillion years just maybe the universe might not exist you should discount any good done in a trillion trillion years.)
“As long as you have a non-zero chance of finitenes (even if that chance limits to zero, even if it’s only a chance in a trillion years time) then you can apply a preference ordering for sooner (or closer events).”
Do you mean moral time discounting, so rejecting impartiality (and so Amanda’s permutation principle)?
I haven’t read Amanda’s work so I cannot say for certain but yes this sounds correct. My view would basically equate to moral time discounting. (If you think in a trillion trillion years just maybe the universe might not exist you should discount any good done in a trillion trillion years.)
Since you are not advocating for a pure time/space preference, I do not think you are rejecting impartiality (nor Amanda’s Permutation Principle).