The study of North Korea may produce insight into how dystopian societal attractor points can be averted or what preventive measures (beyond what is present in today’s North Korea) might help people on the inside destabilize them.
Maybe there’s an unpopularity/coercion downward spiral: the more unpopular a leader becomes, the more the leader needs to rely on coercion in order to stay in power, causing further unpopularity, etc.
Having a source of legitimacy, even if it’s completely arbitrary (the “divine right of kings”), helps forestall the spiral, because the leader doesn’t need coercion to stay in power during periods of unpopularity.
According to this story, the reason communism doesn’t end well is because it’s an ultra-egalitarian ideology that holds status differences to be illegitimate and revolution to be virtuous. So the only rulers able to stay in power do so through coercion. (See: “dominance” vs “prestige” in social science.)
A surprising implication of this view: the existence of democratically ruled countries makes authoritarian countries less nice to live in. Because democracies make autocrats look less legitimate, autocrats need to rely more on coercion to maintain power. This argument also work in reverse: If Putin makes US democracy look less legitimate, anti-Putin coalitions in Russia have a harder time gaining steam, so Putin doesn’t need to crack down as hard on them.
Chinese leaders want a diplomatic solution to the crisis because deposing Kim makes them look less legitimate.
People instinctively want to take a hard line on Kim, but a soft line is an interesting thought experiment. Suppose the US offered Kim $100M to step down. Kim won’t take it, because he knows the US can imprison him as soon as he takes his finger off the nuclear button. And there’s no way the US can credibly precommit to not do this. Well, actually, I can think of a way to get the same effect: Let Kim keep Barron Trump and Sasha Obama as hostages. Not politically viable, and creates bad incentives for other autocrats, but fun to think about.
This is a great point.
[Highly speculative]
Maybe there’s an unpopularity/coercion downward spiral: the more unpopular a leader becomes, the more the leader needs to rely on coercion in order to stay in power, causing further unpopularity, etc.
Having a source of legitimacy, even if it’s completely arbitrary (the “divine right of kings”), helps forestall the spiral, because the leader doesn’t need coercion to stay in power during periods of unpopularity.
According to this story, the reason communism doesn’t end well is because it’s an ultra-egalitarian ideology that holds status differences to be illegitimate and revolution to be virtuous. So the only rulers able to stay in power do so through coercion. (See: “dominance” vs “prestige” in social science.)
A surprising implication of this view: the existence of democratically ruled countries makes authoritarian countries less nice to live in. Because democracies make autocrats look less legitimate, autocrats need to rely more on coercion to maintain power. This argument also work in reverse: If Putin makes US democracy look less legitimate, anti-Putin coalitions in Russia have a harder time gaining steam, so Putin doesn’t need to crack down as hard on them.
Chinese leaders want a diplomatic solution to the crisis because deposing Kim makes them look less legitimate.
People instinctively want to take a hard line on Kim, but a soft line is an interesting thought experiment. Suppose the US offered Kim $100M to step down. Kim won’t take it, because he knows the US can imprison him as soon as he takes his finger off the nuclear button. And there’s no way the US can credibly precommit to not do this. Well, actually, I can think of a way to get the same effect: Let Kim keep Barron Trump and Sasha Obama as hostages. Not politically viable, and creates bad incentives for other autocrats, but fun to think about.