Thanks to Garrett Ehinger for feedback and for writing the last paragraph.
Military conflict around or in the vicinity of biological research laboratories could substantially increase the risk of releasing a dangerous pathogen into the environment. The fighting and mass movement of refugees combine with other risk factors to magnify the potential ramifications of this risk. Garrett Ehinger elaborates on this issue in his excellent Chicago Tribune piece, and proposes the creation of nonaggression treaties for biological labs in war zones as additional pillars to shore up biosecurity norms.
This seems like a great option, but I think there may be a more prompt technical solution as well. Viruses, bacteria, and other dangerous materials in at-risk labs could be stored in containers that have built-in methods to destroy their contents. A strong heating element could be integrated into the storage compartment of each virus and activated by scientists at the lab if a threat seems imminent. Vibration sensors could also automatically activate the system in case of a bombing or an earthquake. This solution would require funding and engineering expertise. I don’t know how much convincing labs would need to integrate it into their existing setups.
If labs might consider the purchase and implementation of entirely new heating elements with their existing containers to be too tall of an order, there are other alternatives. For example, “autoclaves” (the chemist’s equivalent of a ceramic kiln or furnace) are already commonplace in many biological laboratories for purposes such as medium synthesis or equipment sterilization. There could be value for these labs in developing SOPs and recommendations for the safe disposal of risky pathogens via autoclaves. This solution would be quicker and easier to implement, but in an emergency situation, could require slightly more time to safely destroy all the lab’s pathogens.
Destroying viruses in at-risk labs
Thanks to Garrett Ehinger for feedback and for writing the last paragraph.
Military conflict around or in the vicinity of biological research laboratories could substantially increase the risk of releasing a dangerous pathogen into the environment. The fighting and mass movement of refugees combine with other risk factors to magnify the potential ramifications of this risk. Garrett Ehinger elaborates on this issue in his excellent Chicago Tribune piece, and proposes the creation of nonaggression treaties for biological labs in war zones as additional pillars to shore up biosecurity norms.
This seems like a great option, but I think there may be a more prompt technical solution as well. Viruses, bacteria, and other dangerous materials in at-risk labs could be stored in containers that have built-in methods to destroy their contents. A strong heating element could be integrated into the storage compartment of each virus and activated by scientists at the lab if a threat seems imminent. Vibration sensors could also automatically activate the system in case of a bombing or an earthquake. This solution would require funding and engineering expertise. I don’t know how much convincing labs would need to integrate it into their existing setups.
If labs might consider the purchase and implementation of entirely new heating elements with their existing containers to be too tall of an order, there are other alternatives. For example, “autoclaves” (the chemist’s equivalent of a ceramic kiln or furnace) are already commonplace in many biological laboratories for purposes such as medium synthesis or equipment sterilization. There could be value for these labs in developing SOPs and recommendations for the safe disposal of risky pathogens via autoclaves. This solution would be quicker and easier to implement, but in an emergency situation, could require slightly more time to safely destroy all the lab’s pathogens.