Maybe I misunderstood it as an argument for seeing preferences as a terminal value. I think almost all theories would agree “this theory matters in some sense” but I can imagine many ethical theories that do not see “believing in this moral theory” as either good or bad, each for different reasons. Hedonic utilitarianism, as an example of a consequentialist theory, does not see “believing in hedonic utilitarianism” as inherently valuable—depending on the consequences of believing it, it might even recommend not believing it in some contexts—while still positing hedonism itself is true. For a nihilist, “nihilism itself” probably does not matter morally but it does “matter” in terms of its alleged explanatory power.
You could see the luminosity itself as a factor that moderates the intensity of the signal to grow. But there also seem to be many internal processes that moderate the intensity of signals processed by plants: AI points me to a barley study where stress-related calcium signals varied by stimulus, dose, and tissue (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). It still doesn’t require an attention schema—i.e. weighted preferences don’t imply consciousness (at least under your conception of preferences and Graziano’s of consciousness, as I understand them).
Good points, I think I know what you are trying to say. My idea is incomplete or perhaps wrong. Perhaps having a representation of the attention becomes important, but if so, why? I’ll have to think further about this. Thanks
Maybe I misunderstood it as an argument for seeing preferences as a terminal value. I think almost all theories would agree “this theory matters in some sense” but I can imagine many ethical theories that do not see “believing in this moral theory” as either good or bad, each for different reasons. Hedonic utilitarianism, as an example of a consequentialist theory, does not see “believing in hedonic utilitarianism” as inherently valuable—depending on the consequences of believing it, it might even recommend not believing it in some contexts—while still positing hedonism itself is true. For a nihilist, “nihilism itself” probably does not matter morally but it does “matter” in terms of its alleged explanatory power.
You could see the luminosity itself as a factor that moderates the intensity of the signal to grow. But there also seem to be many internal processes that moderate the intensity of signals processed by plants: AI points me to a barley study where stress-related calcium signals varied by stimulus, dose, and tissue (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). It still doesn’t require an attention schema—i.e. weighted preferences don’t imply consciousness (at least under your conception of preferences and Graziano’s of consciousness, as I understand them).
Good points, I think I know what you are trying to say. My idea is incomplete or perhaps wrong. Perhaps having a representation of the attention becomes important, but if so, why? I’ll have to think further about this. Thanks