It would be good to hear from @Luisa_Rodriguez on thisâmy recollection is that she also became a lot more skeptical of the Robock estimates so I am not sure she would still endorse that figure.
Agreed. FYI, I am using a baseline soot distribution equal to a lognormal whose 5th and 95th percentiles match the lower and upper bound of the 90 % confidence interval provided by Luisa in that post (highlighted below):
Additionally, my estimate of the amount of smoke that would be lofted into the atmosphere went up from 20 Tg of smoke (90%CI: 7.9 Tg to 39 Tg of smoke) to 30 Tg of smoke (90%CI: 14 Tg to 66 Tg of smoke). Given this, the probability that a US-Russia nuclear exchange would cause a severe nuclear winter â assuming 50 Tg of smoke is the threshold for severe nuclear winter â goes up from just under 1% to about 11%.
The median of my baseline soot distribution is 30.4 Tg (= (14*66)^0.5), which is 4.15 (= 30.4/â7.32) times Metaculusâ median predicton for the ânext nuclear conflictâ. It is unclear what ânext nuclear conflictâ refers to, but it sounds less severe than âglobal thermonuclear warâ, which is the term Metaculus uses here, and what I am interested in. I have asked for a clarification of the term ânext nuclear conflictâ in November (in the comments), but I have not heard back.
Agreed. FYI, I am using a baseline soot distribution equal to a lognormal whose 5th and 95th percentiles match the lower and upper bound of the 90 % confidence interval provided by Luisa in that post (highlighted below):
The median of my baseline soot distribution is 30.4 Tg (= (14*66)^0.5), which is 4.15 (= 30.4/â7.32) times Metaculusâ median predicton for the ânext nuclear conflictâ. It is unclear what ânext nuclear conflictâ refers to, but it sounds less severe than âglobal thermonuclear warâ, which is the term Metaculus uses here, and what I am interested in. I have asked for a clarification of the term ânext nuclear conflictâ in November (in the comments), but I have not heard back.