>Nothing we do matters for any of several reasons (moral non-realism, infinite ethics, living in a simulation, being a Boltzmann brain, ..?)
I wonder if, in this context, metaethical discussions are overrated. Even if philosophical debates that open the door to nihilism and are endemic in the rationalist community—like Pascal’s mugging, infinite utility, Boltzmann brain (or any simulation / Platonic cave-like reasoning) etc. - are serious philosophical conundrums, they don’t seem (at least from a pragmatic perspective, taking normative uncertainty analysis into account) to entail any relevant change of course in the foreseeable future. I mean, nihilism might be true, but unless you’re certain about it, it doesn’t seem to be practically relevant for decision-making.
>Nothing we do matters for any of several reasons (moral non-realism, infinite ethics, living in a simulation, being a Boltzmann brain, ..?)
I wonder if, in this context, metaethical discussions are overrated. Even if philosophical debates that open the door to nihilism and are endemic in the rationalist community—like Pascal’s mugging, infinite utility, Boltzmann brain (or any simulation / Platonic cave-like reasoning) etc. - are serious philosophical conundrums, they don’t seem (at least from a pragmatic perspective, taking normative uncertainty analysis into account) to entail any relevant change of course in the foreseeable future. I mean, nihilism might be true, but unless you’re certain about it, it doesn’t seem to be practically relevant for decision-making.