On your first question, I think your framing isnât addressing what happens if other people think the same way. The equilibrium where everyone with strong moral convictions feels licensed to break laws doesnât seem to me like itâs better for vulnerable groups, just more chaotic. I think that to some extent youâre proposing smashing the âdefectâ button in a prisonerâs dilemma and hoping the other side doesnât do the same.
On your second, I agree that itâs not a clear line between flawed democracy and dictatorship, but in the US today this isnât really relevant.
On your third, I think the Willowbrook example is worth thinking about more carefully. As I understand the history, the binding constraint at Willowbrook wasnât legal. Many parents and guardians retained custody and could have legally removed their children. The constraint was that families without resources didnât have a better option. And in the end, legal activism was able to marshal those resources, albeit much more slowly than I would have wished.
I think that to some extent youâre proposing smashing the âdefectâ button in a prisonerâs dilemma and hoping the other side doesnât do the same.
Iâve been pondering this. I think your button-smashing characterisation is basically accurate, and it is a leap of faith that those who engage in civil disobedience make: an appeal to the conscience of society, the jury etc..
Youâre right to say that one way to think about universalisability is âif itâs okay for me to break the law to achieve what I consider to be a moral goal here, why canât everyone break the law to achieve their own moral goals?â. But another way to think about universalisability is to go âif I were the one in Ridglan /â Unit 731 /â Willowbrook, what actions would I support to end my suffering?â
I donât know whether it would be illegal for parents to break their children out of Willowbrook, but for the purposes of this question assume it was.
Taking each of these points in turn:
On your first question, I think your framing isnât addressing what happens if other people think the same way. The equilibrium where everyone with strong moral convictions feels licensed to break laws doesnât seem to me like itâs better for vulnerable groups, just more chaotic. I think that to some extent youâre proposing smashing the âdefectâ button in a prisonerâs dilemma and hoping the other side doesnât do the same.
On your second, I agree that itâs not a clear line between flawed democracy and dictatorship, but in the US today this isnât really relevant.
On your third, I think the Willowbrook example is worth thinking about more carefully. As I understand the history, the binding constraint at Willowbrook wasnât legal. Many parents and guardians retained custody and could have legally removed their children. The constraint was that families without resources didnât have a better option. And in the end, legal activism was able to marshal those resources, albeit much more slowly than I would have wished.
Iâve been pondering this. I think your button-smashing characterisation is basically accurate, and it is a leap of faith that those who engage in civil disobedience make: an appeal to the conscience of society, the jury etc..
Youâre right to say that one way to think about universalisability is âif itâs okay for me to break the law to achieve what I consider to be a moral goal here, why canât everyone break the law to achieve their own moral goals?â. But another way to think about universalisability is to go âif I were the one in Ridglan /â Unit 731 /â Willowbrook, what actions would I support to end my suffering?â
I donât know whether it would be illegal for parents to break their children out of Willowbrook, but for the purposes of this question assume it was.