We often seem to value the present more than the future; but I’ll argue that present and future people deserve similar moral treatment—by contrasting individual vs. moral decision-making, and impartially regarding their interests.
I discount my own future welfare at a high rate because my decisions entail relevant opportunity costs: while wealth accumulates, health declines – as individual lives are uncertain and short. However, time passing itself doesn’t make things less important: if I somehow traveled 200 years ahead, my life wouldn’t become less valuable, just like it wasn’t worthier yesterday.
Now, morality. Though you can base your relationships on proximity, does it matter from a moral perspective if people live here or elsewhere? In one or 10^10 days? If you regard all impartially, then discounting for uncertainty should use very low rates, since (unlike me) humanity can last eons. And if you think extinction is terrible, even in a million years: Why would it be so if moral value decreased with time?
Perhaps you adopt a non-consequentialist theory, based on, e.g., reciprocity, and think future generations can’t benefit us. But our lives benefit from extended chains of cooperation characterizing our cultures and economies – we owe those who tamed the fire, and those who’ll pay our long-term debts – and from the expectation of their remaining.
We could see this as some sort of community. This idea is hard to internalize, but sometimes I almost feel it, like in Dear Theodosia: “[...] we’ll give the world to you / And you’ll blow us all away.” We usually want our descendants to surpass us. Thus, assuming they’ll behave similarly and want the same for their successors… Shouldn’t we want the same for every following generation? Love is not “transitive,” but perhaps caring should be.
We often seem to value the present more than the future; but I’ll argue that present and future people deserve similar moral treatment—by contrasting individual vs. moral decision-making, and impartially regarding their interests.
I discount my own future welfare at a high rate because my decisions entail relevant opportunity costs: while wealth accumulates, health declines – as individual lives are uncertain and short. However, time passing itself doesn’t make things less important: if I somehow traveled 200 years ahead, my life wouldn’t become less valuable, just like it wasn’t worthier yesterday.
Now, morality. Though you can base your relationships on proximity, does it matter from a moral perspective if people live here or elsewhere? In one or 10^10 days? If you regard all impartially, then discounting for uncertainty should use very low rates, since (unlike me) humanity can last eons. And if you think extinction is terrible, even in a million years: Why would it be so if moral value decreased with time?
Perhaps you adopt a non-consequentialist theory, based on, e.g., reciprocity, and think future generations can’t benefit us. But our lives benefit from extended chains of cooperation characterizing our cultures and economies – we owe those who tamed the fire, and those who’ll pay our long-term debts – and from the expectation of their remaining.
We could see this as some sort of community. This idea is hard to internalize, but sometimes I almost feel it, like in Dear Theodosia: “[...] we’ll give the world to you / And you’ll blow us all away.” We usually want our descendants to surpass us. Thus, assuming they’ll behave similarly and want the same for their successors… Shouldn’t we want the same for every following generation? Love is not “transitive,” but perhaps caring should be.
Thanks for your submission Ramiro :)