I suppose this is naturally what I’ll want to push back hardest on, since it is the part that is telling me that there is something wrong with my core identity, assumptions about the world, and way I think. Of course that implies it is likely to be tied up with your core emotions, ways of thinking about the world, identity and assumptions—and hence it is much more difficult for any productive conversation to happen (and less likely for conversation, if it becomes productive) to change anyone’s mind.
So a core utilitarian (which is not identical to EA) idea is that if something is bad, it has to be bad ‘for’ someone—and that except in exceptional cases, that badness for that someone will show up in their stream of subjective experiences.
Now certainly mosquitoes, fish, elephants, and small rodents living in Malawi are all someone’s whose subjective wellbeing should have some weight in our moral calculations. But I suspect that I’m wired in a particular way such that I could never care very much about anything that happens to ‘nature’ without affecting anybody’s subjective experiences. This probably goes back to intuitions that cannot be argued with, though possibly they can be modified through prompting examples, social pressure, or by shifting the salience of other considerations and feelings.
At the very least, to the extent that biodiversity (as opposed to individual animals), and nature (as opposed, again, to individual animals) is viewed as important, I’d like to see a greater amount of argument for why this is important for me or for the EA community generally to care about.
Now, I personally would prefer a green earth full of trees, but nothing with brains to a completely dead planet, and I’d prefer more weird species of animals, to every ecological niche being filled with the same type of animal. But this isn’t a very strong preference compared to my preference for a long happy human future—and it is a presence which is not at all prompted by my core utilitarian value system.
===
A comment on insecticide treated insect nets:
It seems like impregnating bed nets with insecticide is the exact opposite of indiscriminate use of insecticide (ie spraying just about everywhere with it), and as a result I would be very surprised if the quantity is enough to cause substantial ecosystem effects.
===
On environmental impact assessment:
Obviously the numbers should be run—at least to the extent that it is not prohibitively expensive to do the study. Research, calculations, checking additional fringe possibilities, etc is not free, and should only be done if it seems like there is a reasonable chance they will tell us that we were making a mistake. However trying to figure out the size of environmental damages from using nets for fishing, burning, from the insecticide messing with children’s hormones etc seems like it would be fairly easy to get a decent guess on how big the effect is at a cost that is reasonable in the context of a program that has so far distributed 400 million dollars worth of nets.
However, based on my priors, I would be fairly surprised if any of these numbers changes the basic conclusion that this is a cheap way to improve the well being of currently living human beings, and that it has a vanishingly small chance of contributing to a plastics driven extinction event caused by fertility collapse.
I suppose my question here is, to what extent are you actually thinking about these issues as something where that whole set of concerns might in actual fact be irrelevant, and to what extent would you resist having your view on the importance of environmental concerns be changed by mechanics level explanations for why a particular bad outcome is unlikely, or by numerical assessments of costs and benefits?
You seem to be saying that environmental concerns have a high chance of convincing us to stop giving out bednets, which will lead to some children dying -- this is the alternative. While changing house designs to discourage mosquitoes sounds like a very good additional idea, I would be shocked if it can be done at the cost of 1 dollar per year per room, like bed nets can be.
Resources are always limited.
So in that context, it is really important that the good thing that we win by stopping giving out bednets to be just a big and awesome of a win as stopping children from dying miserably from malaria. Perhaps that bar can be met—some of your concerns (extinction risks, widespread neurological damage, etc), if they are real, might be worth letting children die to avoid. But those are the stakes that we need to pay attention to.
Thank you for such a comprehensive consideration (and I’m glad you seem to like my newly-coined neologism sapioseparatism enough to use it, even though you disagree with the concept itself :-) ).
I’ll try to address some of your points. Firstly, there is a very good journal article on utilitarianism and biodiversity that I think you might enjoy reading: Why biodiversity matters: A review of the arguments, and counter-arguments, for the conservation of the diversity of life, Abstract
The impact of human activities on the biosphere has accelerated rapidly during the last 200 years, and particularly so since the second half of the 20th century consequent upon an exponential rate of population growth combined with scientific and technological developments. Advances in technology continue to facilitate the exploitation of the world’s organic resources and the manipulation of its physical environment. This has called for increased efforts towards the conservation of the world’s biodiversity so as to reduce the rapid rate of species extinction and decline. This review paper explores the arguments and counter-arguments that have been put forward for the conservation of biological diversity. The ultimate purpose of the review is to broaden the horizon on the value of biodiversity, which will help in diminishing the narrow, humanistic valuation of biodiversity largely responsible for the current biodiversity crisis. Indeed, one of the causes of the accelerated loss of biodiversity has been the utilitarian and human-centred argument that has largely been put forward as justification for the conservation of the world’s biodiversity. The major weakness with a conservation system based on economic motives is that most members of the biological community do not have immediate economic value. Therefore, justifying species preservation for utilitarian purposes predisposes many seemingly useless species to extinction. Only a moral or ethical argument for the conservation of biodiversity in which nature is conserved for its own sake, combined with sustainable use, can ensure a more effective conservation of the world’s organic resources.
This paper also has a fascinating discussion of the utilitarian dilemma with respect to the ‘existence value’ of biodiversity:
Existence value, biodiversity, and the utilitarian dilemma
Abstract Existence value has been argued to be a significant part of the total economic value of some ecosystems. However, its compatibility with the welfare economic foundations of economic valuation is very limited – it is difficult to logically conceive of changes in existence. Moreover, when applied to biodiversity, the concept of existence value gives rise to an instance of a more fundamental problem of economic valuation, termed here the utilitarian dilemma: it can be argued conceptually that biodiversity cannot have existence value; yet the results of empirical studies suggest that people in stated preference studies can be expected to assign existence value to it. The utilitarian dilemma arises as the analysing economist must deal somehow with ‘erroneous’ preferences. There seems to be no simple solution to the dilemma, but deliberative monetary valuation has the potential to alleviate it.
What rational justification is there for conceiving of all living things as possessing inherent worth? In Respect for Nature, Paul Taylor draws on biology, moral philosophy, and environmental science to defend a biocentric environmental ethic in which all life has value. Without making claims for the moral rights of plants and animals, he offers a reasoned alternative to the prevailing anthropocentric view—that the natural environment and its wildlife are valued only as objects for human use or enjoyment. Respect for Nature provides both a full account of the biological conditions for life—human or otherwise—and a comprehensive view of the complex relationship between human beings and the whole of nature.
This classic book remains a valuable resource for philosophers, biologists, and environmentalists alike—along with all those who care about the future of life on Earth. A new foreword by Dale Jamieson looks at how the original 1986 edition of Respect for Nature has shaped the study of environmental ethics, and shows why the work remains relevant to debates today.
Author information
Paul W. Taylor (1923–2015) was professor emeritus of philosophy at Brooklyn College, City University of New York.
Reviews
“When it first appeared, Respect for Nature was at once recognized for the important, groundbreaking work it was. It was deservedly a major influence in the then newly developing field of environmental ethics. Time has only confirmed this first opinion and it is good to have the book back before us.”—Michael Ruse, editor of Philosophy after Darwin
“Paul Taylor notes that just as we would not ask ‘What is a human being good for?,’ so also should we not ask ‘What is nature good for?’ This is surely right. His Respect for Nature is a systematic working out of the consequences of this observation. It is even more relevant today than when it first appeared twenty-five years ago.”—Stephen Darwall, Yale University
About sapioseparatism:
I suppose this is naturally what I’ll want to push back hardest on, since it is the part that is telling me that there is something wrong with my core identity, assumptions about the world, and way I think. Of course that implies it is likely to be tied up with your core emotions, ways of thinking about the world, identity and assumptions—and hence it is much more difficult for any productive conversation to happen (and less likely for conversation, if it becomes productive) to change anyone’s mind.
So a core utilitarian (which is not identical to EA) idea is that if something is bad, it has to be bad ‘for’ someone—and that except in exceptional cases, that badness for that someone will show up in their stream of subjective experiences.
Now certainly mosquitoes, fish, elephants, and small rodents living in Malawi are all someone’s whose subjective wellbeing should have some weight in our moral calculations. But I suspect that I’m wired in a particular way such that I could never care very much about anything that happens to ‘nature’ without affecting anybody’s subjective experiences. This probably goes back to intuitions that cannot be argued with, though possibly they can be modified through prompting examples, social pressure, or by shifting the salience of other considerations and feelings.
At the very least, to the extent that biodiversity (as opposed to individual animals), and nature (as opposed, again, to individual animals) is viewed as important, I’d like to see a greater amount of argument for why this is important for me or for the EA community generally to care about.
Now, I personally would prefer a green earth full of trees, but nothing with brains to a completely dead planet, and I’d prefer more weird species of animals, to every ecological niche being filled with the same type of animal. But this isn’t a very strong preference compared to my preference for a long happy human future—and it is a presence which is not at all prompted by my core utilitarian value system.
===
A comment on insecticide treated insect nets:
It seems like impregnating bed nets with insecticide is the exact opposite of indiscriminate use of insecticide (ie spraying just about everywhere with it), and as a result I would be very surprised if the quantity is enough to cause substantial ecosystem effects.
===
On environmental impact assessment:
Obviously the numbers should be run—at least to the extent that it is not prohibitively expensive to do the study. Research, calculations, checking additional fringe possibilities, etc is not free, and should only be done if it seems like there is a reasonable chance they will tell us that we were making a mistake. However trying to figure out the size of environmental damages from using nets for fishing, burning, from the insecticide messing with children’s hormones etc seems like it would be fairly easy to get a decent guess on how big the effect is at a cost that is reasonable in the context of a program that has so far distributed 400 million dollars worth of nets.
However, based on my priors, I would be fairly surprised if any of these numbers changes the basic conclusion that this is a cheap way to improve the well being of currently living human beings, and that it has a vanishingly small chance of contributing to a plastics driven extinction event caused by fertility collapse.
I suppose my question here is, to what extent are you actually thinking about these issues as something where that whole set of concerns might in actual fact be irrelevant, and to what extent would you resist having your view on the importance of environmental concerns be changed by mechanics level explanations for why a particular bad outcome is unlikely, or by numerical assessments of costs and benefits?
You seem to be saying that environmental concerns have a high chance of convincing us to stop giving out bednets, which will lead to some children dying -- this is the alternative. While changing house designs to discourage mosquitoes sounds like a very good additional idea, I would be shocked if it can be done at the cost of 1 dollar per year per room, like bed nets can be.
Resources are always limited.
So in that context, it is really important that the good thing that we win by stopping giving out bednets to be just a big and awesome of a win as stopping children from dying miserably from malaria. Perhaps that bar can be met—some of your concerns (extinction risks, widespread neurological damage, etc), if they are real, might be worth letting children die to avoid. But those are the stakes that we need to pay attention to.
Thank you for such a comprehensive consideration (and I’m glad you seem to like my newly-coined neologism sapioseparatism enough to use it, even though you disagree with the concept itself :-) ).
I’ll try to address some of your points. Firstly, there is a very good journal article on utilitarianism and biodiversity that I think you might enjoy reading: Why biodiversity matters: A review of the arguments, and counter-arguments, for the conservation of the diversity of life, Abstract
The impact of human activities on the biosphere has accelerated rapidly during the last 200 years, and particularly so since the second half of the 20th century consequent upon an exponential rate of population growth combined with scientific and technological developments. Advances in technology continue to facilitate the exploitation of the world’s organic resources and the manipulation of its physical environment. This has called for increased efforts towards the conservation of the world’s biodiversity so as to reduce the rapid rate of species extinction and decline. This review paper explores the arguments and counter-arguments that have been put forward for the conservation of biological diversity. The ultimate purpose of the review is to broaden the horizon on the value of biodiversity, which will help in diminishing the narrow, humanistic valuation of biodiversity largely responsible for the current biodiversity crisis. Indeed, one of the causes of the accelerated loss of biodiversity has been the utilitarian and human-centred argument that has largely been put forward as justification for the conservation of the world’s biodiversity. The major weakness with a conservation system based on economic motives is that most members of the biological community do not have immediate economic value. Therefore, justifying species preservation for utilitarian purposes predisposes many seemingly useless species to extinction. Only a moral or ethical argument for the conservation of biodiversity in which nature is conserved for its own sake, combined with sustainable use, can ensure a more effective conservation of the world’s organic resources.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tanyaradzwa-Chigonda/publication/328048844_Why_biodiversity_matters_A_review_of_the_arguments_and_counter-arguments_for_the_conservation_of_the_diversity_of_life/links/5bb4d93692851ca9ed3777ee/Why-biodiversity-matters-A-review-of-the-arguments-and-counter-arguments-for-the-conservation-of-the-diversity-of-life.pdf?origin=publication_detail
This paper also has a fascinating discussion of the utilitarian dilemma with respect to the ‘existence value’ of biodiversity:
Existence value, biodiversity, and the utilitarian dilemma
Abstract
Existence value has been argued to be a significant part of the total economic value of some
ecosystems. However, its compatibility with the welfare economic foundations of economic
valuation is very limited – it is difficult to logically conceive of changes in existence. Moreover,
when applied to biodiversity, the concept of existence value gives rise to an instance of a more
fundamental problem of economic valuation, termed here the utilitarian dilemma: it can be
argued conceptually that biodiversity cannot have existence value; yet the results of empirical
studies suggest that people in stated preference studies can be expected to assign existence value
to it. The utilitarian dilemma arises as the analysing economist must deal somehow with
‘erroneous’ preferences. There seems to be no simple solution to the dilemma, but deliberative
monetary valuation has the potential to alleviate it.
https://www.ufz.de/export/data/global/138112_DP_2017_2_Bartkowksi.pdf
I also recommend: Respect for Nature
A Theory of Environmental Ethics − 25th Anniversary Edition
Paul W. Taylor
In the series Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400838530
About this book
What rational justification is there for conceiving of all living things as possessing inherent worth? In Respect for Nature, Paul Taylor draws on biology, moral philosophy, and environmental science to defend a biocentric environmental ethic in which all life has value. Without making claims for the moral rights of plants and animals, he offers a reasoned alternative to the prevailing anthropocentric view—that the natural environment and its wildlife are valued only as objects for human use or enjoyment. Respect for Nature provides both a full account of the biological conditions for life—human or otherwise—and a comprehensive view of the complex relationship between human beings and the whole of nature.
This classic book remains a valuable resource for philosophers, biologists, and environmentalists alike—along with all those who care about the future of life on Earth. A new foreword by Dale Jamieson looks at how the original 1986 edition of Respect for Nature has shaped the study of environmental ethics, and shows why the work remains relevant to debates today.
Author information
Paul W. Taylor (1923–2015) was professor emeritus of philosophy at Brooklyn College, City University of New York.
Reviews
“When it first appeared, Respect for Nature was at once recognized for the important, groundbreaking work it was. It was deservedly a major influence in the then newly developing field of environmental ethics. Time has only confirmed this first opinion and it is good to have the book back before us.”—Michael Ruse, editor of Philosophy after Darwin
“Paul Taylor notes that just as we would not ask ‘What is a human being good for?,’ so also should we not ask ‘What is nature good for?’ This is surely right. His Respect for Nature is a systematic working out of the consequences of this observation. It is even more relevant today than when it first appeared twenty-five years ago.”—Stephen Darwall, Yale University