I’m not well-learned enough on this, but it seems that you would appreciate this very cool recent post which (badly summarized) kind of explains how one can still have forms of moral action-guidance even if some sound moral theories (in your post, a form of impartial consequentialism?) imply that “none of our actions matter” : Resolving radical cluelessness with metanormative bracketing.
I’m not well-learned enough on this, but it seems that you would appreciate this very cool recent post which (badly summarized) kind of explains how one can still have forms of moral action-guidance even if some sound moral theories (in your post, a form of impartial consequentialism?) imply that “none of our actions matter” : Resolving radical cluelessness with metanormative bracketing.
Thanks Jo! Yeah, the perspective I defend in that post in a nutshell is:
The “reasons” given by different normative views are qualitatively different.
So, when choosing between A and B, we should look at whether each normative view gives us reason to prefer A over B (or B over A).
If consequentialist views say A and B are incomparable, these views don’t give me a reason to prefer A over B (or B over A).
Therefore, if the other normative views in aggregate say A is preferable, I have more reason to choose A.
(Similarly, the decision theory of “bracketing” might also resolve incomparability within consequentialism, but see here for some challenges.)
Re: the first link, what do you think of Dynamic Strong Maximality, which avoids money pumps while allowing for incomparability?