Agreed. I didn’t mean to imply that totalism is the only view sensitive to the mortality-fertility relationship—just that the results could be fairly different on totalism and that it’s especially important to see the results on totalism and that it makes sense to look at totalism before other population ethical views not yet considered. Exploring other population ethical views would be good too!
If parents are trying to have a set number of children (survive to adulthood) then the effects of reducing mortality might not change the total number of future people much, because parents adjust fertility
I think my concern here was that the post suggested that saving lives might not be very valuable on totalism due to a high fertility adjustment:
A report writtenfor GiveWell estimated that in some areas where it recommends charities the number of births averted per life saved is as large as 1:1, a ratio at which population size and growth are left effectively unchanged by saving lives.[45] For totalists, the value of saving lives in a 1:1 context would be very small (compared to one where there was no fertility reduction) as the value of saving one life is ‘negated’ by the disvalue of causing one less life to be created.
Roodman’s report (if I recall correctly) suggested that this likely happens to a lower degree in areas where infant mortality is high (i.e. parents adjust fertility less in high infant mortality settings) so saving lives in these settings is plausibly still very valuable according to totalism.
Okay, we’re on the same page on all of this. :) A further specific empirical project would involve trying to understand population dynamics in the locations EAs are considering.
Agreed. I didn’t mean to imply that totalism is the only view sensitive to the mortality-fertility relationship—just that the results could be fairly different on totalism and that it’s especially important to see the results on totalism and that it makes sense to look at totalism before other population ethical views not yet considered. Exploring other population ethical views would be good too!
I think my concern here was that the post suggested that saving lives might not be very valuable on totalism due to a high fertility adjustment:
Roodman’s report (if I recall correctly) suggested that this likely happens to a lower degree in areas where infant mortality is high (i.e. parents adjust fertility less in high infant mortality settings) so saving lives in these settings is plausibly still very valuable according to totalism.
Okay, we’re on the same page on all of this. :) A further specific empirical project would involve trying to understand population dynamics in the locations EAs are considering.
Yep, agreed!