I really like this. To me, it emphasizes that moral reason is a species of practical reason more generally and that the way moral reasons make themselves heard to us is through the generic architecture of practical reasoning. More precisely: Acting in a manner consistent with one’s moral duties is not about setting one’s preferences aside and living a life of self-denial; it’s about being sufficiently attentive to one’s moral world that one’s preferences naturally evolve in response to sound moral reasons, such that satisfying those preferences and fulfilling one’s duties are one and the same.
I really like this. To me, it emphasizes that moral reason is a species of practical reason more generally and that the way moral reasons make themselves heard to us is through the generic architecture of practical reasoning. More precisely: Acting in a manner consistent with one’s moral duties is not about setting one’s preferences aside and living a life of self-denial; it’s about being sufficiently attentive to one’s moral world that one’s preferences naturally evolve in response to sound moral reasons, such that satisfying those preferences and fulfilling one’s duties are one and the same.