Can you say a bit more about why the quote is objectionable? I can see why the conclusion ‘saving a life in a rich country is substantially more important than saving a life in a poor country’ would be objectionable. But it seems Beckstead is saying something more like ‘here is an argument for saving lives in rich countries being relatively more important than saving lives in poor countries’ (because he says ‘other things being equal’).
I’m not sure I understand your distinction – are you saying that while it would be objectionable to conclude that saving lives in rich countries is more “substantially more important”, it is not objectionable to merely present an argument in favour of this conclusion?
I think if you provide arguments that lead to a very troubling conclusion, then you should ensure that they’re very strongly supported, eg by empirical or historical evidence. Since Beckstead didn’t do that (which perhaps is to be expected in a philosophy thesis), I think it would at the very least have been appropriate to recognise that the premises for the argument are extremely speculative.
I also think the argument warrants some disclaimers – e.g., a warning that following this line of reasoning could lead to undesirable neglect of global poverty or a disclaimer that we should be very wary of any argument that leads to conclusions like ‘we should prioritise people like ourselves.’
Like Dylan Balfour said above, I am otherwise a big fan of this important dissertation; I just think that this quote is not a great look and it exemplifies a form of reasoning that we longtermists should be careful about.
I’m not sure I understand your distinction – are you saying that while it would be objectionable to conclude that saving lives in rich countries is more “substantially more important”, it is not objectionable to merely present an argument in favour of this conclusion?
Yep that is what I’m saying. I think I don’t agree but thanks for explaining :)
The main issue I have with this quote is that it’s so divorced from the reality of how cost effective it is to save lives in rich countries vs. poor countries (something that most EAs probably know already). I understand that this objection is addressed by the caveat ‘other things being equal’, but it seems important to note that it costs orders of magnitude more to save lives in rich countries, so unless Beckstead thinks the knock-on effects of saving lives in rich countries are sufficient to offset the cost differences, it would still follow that we should focus our money on saving lives in poor countries.
I don’t understand why thinking like that quote isn’t totally passe to EAs. At least to utilitarian EAs. If anyone’s allowed to think hypothetically (“divorced from the reality”) I would think it would be a philosophy grad student writing a dissertation.
I think there should be strong norms against making arguments that justify shifting resources from the least well-off people to the best-off people in the world. These types of ideas have been used by people in power to justify global inequality.
In 1991, Larry Summers, then the chief economist at the World Bank, sent a memo arguing that pollution should be pushed to poorer places because it’s more economically efficient. Around the same time, Texaco was leaving open pools of carcinogenic substances all over the Ecuadorian rainforest, which contributed to elevated cancer rates in the local population. There were ways to safely dispose of the toxic waste produced by oil drilling, but they weren’t employed because the lives of indigenous Ecuadorian people weren’t sufficiently valued by Texaco.
If Beckstead had added a parenthetical like “(However, it’s typically many orders of magnitude cheaper to save lives in poor countries than in rich countries),” I wouldn’t take the same issue with the quote.
I think it’s important for EA to promote high decoupling in intellectual spaces. You also have to consider that this is a philosophy dissertation, which is an almost maximally decoupling space.
Again, Beckstead could have made the exact same point while offering my parenthetical. It would have communicated the same idea while also acknowledging the real world context. I’m not opposed to decoupling or thought experiments to help clarify our positions on things.
Yes I think that Summers was wrong. Extending his logic, companies should take even fewer steps to mitigate pollution in industrial practices in poor countries than they do in rich countries, because the economic costs of doing so are lower in poor countries and because it’s probably cheaper and therefore more economically efficient to not mitigate pollution. He even says in the memo that moral reasons and social concerns could be invoked to oppose his line of reasoning, which seems relevant to people who claim to want to do good in the world, not just maximize a narrow understanding of economic productivity.
What that can look like in practice is what Texaco did in Ecuador. I’m not claiming a direct causal link between the Summers’ memo and Texaco’s actions. I’m simply saying that when intellectual elites make arguments that it’s okay to pollute more in poor countries, we shouldn’t be surprised when they do so.
Can you say a bit more about why the quote is objectionable? I can see why the conclusion ‘saving a life in a rich country is substantially more important than saving a life in a poor country’ would be objectionable. But it seems Beckstead is saying something more like ‘here is an argument for saving lives in rich countries being relatively more important than saving lives in poor countries’ (because he says ‘other things being equal’).
I’m not sure I understand your distinction – are you saying that while it would be objectionable to conclude that saving lives in rich countries is more “substantially more important”, it is not objectionable to merely present an argument in favour of this conclusion?
I think if you provide arguments that lead to a very troubling conclusion, then you should ensure that they’re very strongly supported, eg by empirical or historical evidence. Since Beckstead didn’t do that (which perhaps is to be expected in a philosophy thesis), I think it would at the very least have been appropriate to recognise that the premises for the argument are extremely speculative.
I also think the argument warrants some disclaimers – e.g., a warning that following this line of reasoning could lead to undesirable neglect of global poverty or a disclaimer that we should be very wary of any argument that leads to conclusions like ‘we should prioritise people like ourselves.’
Like Dylan Balfour said above, I am otherwise a big fan of this important dissertation; I just think that this quote is not a great look and it exemplifies a form of reasoning that we longtermists should be careful about.
Yep that is what I’m saying. I think I don’t agree but thanks for explaining :)
The main issue I have with this quote is that it’s so divorced from the reality of how cost effective it is to save lives in rich countries vs. poor countries (something that most EAs probably know already). I understand that this objection is addressed by the caveat ‘other things being equal’, but it seems important to note that it costs orders of magnitude more to save lives in rich countries, so unless Beckstead thinks the knock-on effects of saving lives in rich countries are sufficient to offset the cost differences, it would still follow that we should focus our money on saving lives in poor countries.
I don’t understand why thinking like that quote isn’t totally passe to EAs. At least to utilitarian EAs. If anyone’s allowed to think hypothetically (“divorced from the reality”) I would think it would be a philosophy grad student writing a dissertation.
I think there should be strong norms against making arguments that justify shifting resources from the least well-off people to the best-off people in the world. These types of ideas have been used by people in power to justify global inequality.
In 1991, Larry Summers, then the chief economist at the World Bank, sent a memo arguing that pollution should be pushed to poorer places because it’s more economically efficient. Around the same time, Texaco was leaving open pools of carcinogenic substances all over the Ecuadorian rainforest, which contributed to elevated cancer rates in the local population. There were ways to safely dispose of the toxic waste produced by oil drilling, but they weren’t employed because the lives of indigenous Ecuadorian people weren’t sufficiently valued by Texaco.
If Beckstead had added a parenthetical like “(However, it’s typically many orders of magnitude cheaper to save lives in poor countries than in rich countries),” I wouldn’t take the same issue with the quote.
I think it’s important for EA to promote high decoupling in intellectual spaces. You also have to consider that this is a philosophy dissertation, which is an almost maximally decoupling space.
Again, Beckstead could have made the exact same point while offering my parenthetical. It would have communicated the same idea while also acknowledging the real world context. I’m not opposed to decoupling or thought experiments to help clarify our positions on things.
Are you implying that Larry Summers was wrong or that Texaco’s actions were somehow his fault?
Yes I think that Summers was wrong. Extending his logic, companies should take even fewer steps to mitigate pollution in industrial practices in poor countries than they do in rich countries, because the economic costs of doing so are lower in poor countries and because it’s probably cheaper and therefore more economically efficient to not mitigate pollution. He even says in the memo that moral reasons and social concerns could be invoked to oppose his line of reasoning, which seems relevant to people who claim to want to do good in the world, not just maximize a narrow understanding of economic productivity.
What that can look like in practice is what Texaco did in Ecuador. I’m not claiming a direct causal link between the Summers’ memo and Texaco’s actions. I’m simply saying that when intellectual elites make arguments that it’s okay to pollute more in poor countries, we shouldn’t be surprised when they do so.