I think we agree: the massive uncertainty in the utility calculus approach to this problem could go either way and so it tells us nothing.
In the end we’re forced to fall back on our moral intuitions like: “harpooning whale feels bad” and comparative arguments like: “well if you wouldn’t suffocate your dog, how can you pay someone to suffocate a pig?”. This is the only feasible approach.
I think we can put some reasonable bounds on our uncertainty and ranges, and they can tell us some useful things. Or, at least, I can, according to my own intuitions, and end up prioritizing animal welfare this way.
Also, I’ve argued here that uncertainty about moral weights actually tends to further favour prioritizing nonhumans.
I think we agree: the massive uncertainty in the utility calculus approach to this problem could go either way and so it tells us nothing.
In the end we’re forced to fall back on our moral intuitions like: “harpooning whale feels bad” and comparative arguments like: “well if you wouldn’t suffocate your dog, how can you pay someone to suffocate a pig?”. This is the only feasible approach.
I think we can put some reasonable bounds on our uncertainty and ranges, and they can tell us some useful things. Or, at least, I can, according to my own intuitions, and end up prioritizing animal welfare this way.
Also, I’ve argued here that uncertainty about moral weights actually tends to further favour prioritizing nonhumans.