Totally agree that intent alignment does basically nothing to solve misuse risks. To weigh the importance of misuse risks, we should consider (a) how quickly AI to AGI happens, (b) whether the first group to deploy AGI will use it to prevent other groups from developing AGI, (c) how quickly AGI to superintelligence happens, (d) how widely accessible AI will be to the public as it develops, (e) the destructive power of AI misuse at various stages of AI capability, etc.
I increasingly get the sense that AI alignment as a field is defining itself so narrowly...
Paul Christiano’s 2019 EAG-SF talk highlights how there are so many other important subproblems within “make AI go well” besides intent alignment. Of course, Paul doesn’t speak for “AI alignment as a field.”
Totally agree that intent alignment does basically nothing to solve misuse risks. To weigh the importance of misuse risks, we should consider (a) how quickly AI to AGI happens, (b) whether the first group to deploy AGI will use it to prevent other groups from developing AGI, (c) how quickly AGI to superintelligence happens, (d) how widely accessible AI will be to the public as it develops, (e) the destructive power of AI misuse at various stages of AI capability, etc.
Paul Christiano’s 2019 EAG-SF talk highlights how there are so many other important subproblems within “make AI go well” besides intent alignment. Of course, Paul doesn’t speak for “AI alignment as a field.”