Executive summary: The author argues that critiques of de-extinction should center the welfare and subjective interests of the animals created, and that once these interests are properly considered, the case against de-extinction becomes even stronger.
Key points:
The author criticizes Katz (2022) for attempting to exclude animal welfare from de-extinction debates, arguing that Katz’s ostensibly ontological and epistemological arguments inevitably rely on ethical assumptions.
Katz’s framing is described as anthropocentric, focusing on human concepts such as domination, authenticity, and wildness while erasing the de-extinct animals as subjects with interests of their own.
The author claims that what matters to animals affected by de-extinction is the harm to their specific interests, not abstract human concerns about control or naturalness.
De-extinct animals are often treated in the literature as “artifacts,” “products,” or deficient representatives of their species, which the author argues ignores their lived perspective as feeling beings.
The paper contrasts externalist evaluations of de-extinction with an internalist approach that prioritizes animals’ subjective welfare and whether their lives are worth living to them.
Given current ignorance about the wellbeing of de-extinct animals, suggested harms to their welfare strengthen existing ethical objections to de-extinction rather than weaken them.
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Executive summary: The author argues that critiques of de-extinction should center the welfare and subjective interests of the animals created, and that once these interests are properly considered, the case against de-extinction becomes even stronger.
Key points:
The author criticizes Katz (2022) for attempting to exclude animal welfare from de-extinction debates, arguing that Katz’s ostensibly ontological and epistemological arguments inevitably rely on ethical assumptions.
Katz’s framing is described as anthropocentric, focusing on human concepts such as domination, authenticity, and wildness while erasing the de-extinct animals as subjects with interests of their own.
The author claims that what matters to animals affected by de-extinction is the harm to their specific interests, not abstract human concerns about control or naturalness.
De-extinct animals are often treated in the literature as “artifacts,” “products,” or deficient representatives of their species, which the author argues ignores their lived perspective as feeling beings.
The paper contrasts externalist evaluations of de-extinction with an internalist approach that prioritizes animals’ subjective welfare and whether their lives are worth living to them.
Given current ignorance about the wellbeing of de-extinct animals, suggested harms to their welfare strengthen existing ethical objections to de-extinction rather than weaken them.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.