If one values 1 unit of welfare in animals as much as 1 unit of welfare in humans
Rejecting this implies rejecting hedonistic utilitarianism if welfare above is interpreted as hedonic welfare. I have now changed “welfare” to “hedonic welfare” above.
assuming we are hedonistic utilitarians
Holding everything else constant in my calculations, one would have to be less than 0.0662 % (= 1/(1.51*10^3)) hedonistic utilitarian to prioritise GiveWell’s top charities over corporate campaigns for chicken welfare. Weighting hedonistic utilitarianism so lightly, I think:
Current factory-farming could easily be justified. In essence, because one would be able to value eating factory-farmed animals up to 1.51 k times as much as today.
There would also be no obvious reason to support global health and development interventions. Such support makes sense assuming an additional year of healthy life or a given relative increase in income are worth roughly the same regardless of the person, but this is only obviously the case if one values hedonic welfare the same regardless of who experiences it.
I suspect people who prioritise global health and development over animal welfare implicitly endorse hedonistic utilitarianism for comparisons between interventions targeting people, but reject it for comparisons across species.
Thanks, Nick.
Rejecting this implies rejecting hedonistic utilitarianism if welfare above is interpreted as hedonic welfare. I have now changed “welfare” to “hedonic welfare” above.
Holding everything else constant in my calculations, one would have to be less than 0.0662 % (= 1/(1.51*10^3)) hedonistic utilitarian to prioritise GiveWell’s top charities over corporate campaigns for chicken welfare. Weighting hedonistic utilitarianism so lightly, I think:
Current factory-farming could easily be justified. In essence, because one would be able to value eating factory-farmed animals up to 1.51 k times as much as today.
There would also be no obvious reason to support global health and development interventions. Such support makes sense assuming an additional year of healthy life or a given relative increase in income are worth roughly the same regardless of the person, but this is only obviously the case if one values hedonic welfare the same regardless of who experiences it.
I suspect people who prioritise global health and development over animal welfare implicitly endorse hedonistic utilitarianism for comparisons between interventions targeting people, but reject it for comparisons across species.