[Epistemic status: diverse moral parliament with significant deontological and virtue-ethics representation, along with concern about fair distribution of good and bad things]
Rich people in the Western World saying that poor people in Developing countries do not deserve to live/exist? bad bad bad bad bad
Relatedly, I find it concerning that the initial jump is from “increased human population may be net negative due to effects on farmed animal welfare” to “maybe we should refrain from preventing death among infants and toddlers in Africa.” I’m not advocating pro-death policies like withholding lifesaving medical care anywhere, but in a sense I would find it less objectionable if consistently applied rather than beng focused on developing countries?
That sense is coming from various places, including the interest in impartiality, the concern about powerful people furthering their objectives by forcing powerless people to bear the costs, and a distaste for free-riding (not having oneself or even one’s society share in the risk of death “needed” to achieve the objective). There are also the empirical weaknesses (e.g., that these kids aren’t nearly as likely to be eating much factory-farmed meat in the future, that failing to prevent their death may have a minimal effect on total global population) that may not be immediately discernable, but don’t need extensive reflection to see.
Moreover, there are also other policies and practices I would expect to see well before withholding life-saving medical care to young children were anywhere near the table:
In expectancy, the kids of EAs will likely consume more factory-farmed meat than young children in developing countries, so choosing to not have kids seems a fairly obvious step.
Although I’m not usually one for calling non-billionaires out for not donating a large fraction of their income, “this problem is grave enough that we should consider saving the lives of innocent young children as a net negative” seemingly implies “this problem is grave enough that I am morally obliged to donate at least most of my material resources to mitigating it and should be criticized for failing to do so.” If it’s not worth a 51% donation rate from me, how is it possibly worth what we would be expecting the would-be AMF beneficiaries to sacrifice for the cause?
[Epistemic status: diverse moral parliament with significant deontological and virtue-ethics representation, along with concern about fair distribution of good and bad things]
Relatedly, I find it concerning that the initial jump is from “increased human population may be net negative due to effects on farmed animal welfare” to “maybe we should refrain from preventing death among infants and toddlers in Africa.” I’m not advocating pro-death policies like withholding lifesaving medical care anywhere, but in a sense I would find it less objectionable if consistently applied rather than beng focused on developing countries?
That sense is coming from various places, including the interest in impartiality, the concern about powerful people furthering their objectives by forcing powerless people to bear the costs, and a distaste for free-riding (not having oneself or even one’s society share in the risk of death “needed” to achieve the objective). There are also the empirical weaknesses (e.g., that these kids aren’t nearly as likely to be eating much factory-farmed meat in the future, that failing to prevent their death may have a minimal effect on total global population) that may not be immediately discernable, but don’t need extensive reflection to see.
Moreover, there are also other policies and practices I would expect to see well before withholding life-saving medical care to young children were anywhere near the table:
In expectancy, the kids of EAs will likely consume more factory-farmed meat than young children in developing countries, so choosing to not have kids seems a fairly obvious step.
Although I’m not usually one for calling non-billionaires out for not donating a large fraction of their income, “this problem is grave enough that we should consider saving the lives of innocent young children as a net negative” seemingly implies “this problem is grave enough that I am morally obliged to donate at least most of my material resources to mitigating it and should be criticized for failing to do so.” If it’s not worth a 51% donation rate from me, how is it possibly worth what we would be expecting the would-be AMF beneficiaries to sacrifice for the cause?