To be honest I feel like this is all part of the high-risk high-reward that is crypto . This is not the first crash and probably won’t be the last. I would treat this as an interesting exercise for EAs in general who are considering similar high-risk high-reward careers—it’s a good time to ask yourself if you are prepared to take on the high-risk part if it comes down to that, with a very vivid example now.
Of course, there were things that could be handled by FTX/Alameda better (and also Binance if they were truly benevolent), but interesting thought experiment to consider for the rest of us not directly involved, and for us to personally extract some use out of this.
I’ve worked in crypto since March this year (though not in crypto trading, so I’m sheltered from the worst of it) and I’ve enough money locked up in FTX and BlockFi for it to sting, so I’m learning some lessons here too.
This is just categorically wrong and mistaken. This is not a question of a company operating in a high-risk and high-reward sector, but one of fraud. FTX used its customer’s deposits to stave off Alameda’s own insolvency and essentially stole his users’ funds. Labeling this as a thought experiment or as something that could be handled better is inaccurate and does a disservice to the irresponsible and immoral actions that took place here. It is not an interesting exercise that FTX owes its users close to $10 billion. Now, we are all left wondering what exactly happened here and who enabled such egregious actions. This is honestly a Lehman moment for crypto or a Enron-type event.
The collapse of an exchange is qualitatively different than the collapse of coin. His clients did not perceive risk, and there was no compensation for the risk that they were unknowingly subject to. That is fraud.
Moreover, if SBF viewed fraudulent behaviour for the purposes of EA as “high-risk high-reward” it signals there are norms within EA that are in dire need of clarification and/or change. Tolerance for fraud would lead to disastrous consequences for EA in the long-run.
Moreover, if SBF viewed fraudulent behaviour for the purposes of EA as “high-risk high-reward” it signals there are norms within EA that are in dire need of clarification and/or change.
That’s my concern as well.
Just as concerning is how EA (leadership) may have reacted if the events that transpired at FTX were identical but SBF ended up turning billions of profit instead of sustaining immense loss. What would be our reaction to that?
In this alternative universe, I’d imagine he’d receive only a bit of censure, instead being rewarded with significant praise by EA leadership for his willingness to take on risk and make 51 EV bets. Community members might assert that it doesn’t matter what he did so long as the consequences ensured he was going the greatest good possible. They would be captivated, enchanted by promises of further funding.
These condemnations are because SBF committed fraud and lost. If he did all that and won the jackpot, I imagine his reception here would be rather different.
To be honest I feel like this is all part of the high-risk high-reward that is crypto . This is not the first crash and probably won’t be the last. I would treat this as an interesting exercise for EAs in general who are considering similar high-risk high-reward careers—it’s a good time to ask yourself if you are prepared to take on the high-risk part if it comes down to that, with a very vivid example now.
Of course, there were things that could be handled by FTX/Alameda better (and also Binance if they were truly benevolent), but interesting thought experiment to consider for the rest of us not directly involved, and for us to personally extract some use out of this.
I’ve worked in crypto since March this year (though not in crypto trading, so I’m sheltered from the worst of it) and I’ve enough money locked up in FTX and BlockFi for it to sting, so I’m learning some lessons here too.
This is just categorically wrong and mistaken. This is not a question of a company operating in a high-risk and high-reward sector, but one of fraud. FTX used its customer’s deposits to stave off Alameda’s own insolvency and essentially stole his users’ funds. Labeling this as a thought experiment or as something that could be handled better is inaccurate and does a disservice to the irresponsible and immoral actions that took place here. It is not an interesting exercise that FTX owes its users close to $10 billion. Now, we are all left wondering what exactly happened here and who enabled such egregious actions. This is honestly a Lehman moment for crypto or a Enron-type event.
The collapse of an exchange is qualitatively different than the collapse of coin. His clients did not perceive risk, and there was no compensation for the risk that they were unknowingly subject to. That is fraud.
Moreover, if SBF viewed fraudulent behaviour for the purposes of EA as “high-risk high-reward” it signals there are norms within EA that are in dire need of clarification and/or change. Tolerance for fraud would lead to disastrous consequences for EA in the long-run.
That’s my concern as well.
Just as concerning is how EA (leadership) may have reacted if the events that transpired at FTX were identical but SBF ended up turning billions of profit instead of sustaining immense loss. What would be our reaction to that?
In this alternative universe, I’d imagine he’d receive only a bit of censure, instead being rewarded with significant praise by EA leadership for his willingness to take on risk and make 51 EV bets. Community members might assert that it doesn’t matter what he did so long as the consequences ensured he was going the greatest good possible. They would be captivated, enchanted by promises of further funding.
These condemnations are because SBF committed fraud and lost. If he did all that and won the jackpot, I imagine his reception here would be rather different.