Either would be better, but itโs hard to imagine someone not being worse off by their own lights in any way from not eating properly (felt unpleasantness, weakness making it harder to do things, risk of death, etc.). If that were not true about eating properly, then people might not prioritize it in the first place. If we could make it so that people didnโt need to eat to avoid being worse off in important ways, all else equal, that would be better.
They should be, under preference-affecting preference utilitarianism or negative preference utilitarianism (which is antifrustrationist), or possibly for more indirect or contingent reasons, any form of preference utilitarianism.
Either would be better, but itโs hard to imagine someone not being worse off by their own lights in any way from not eating properly (felt unpleasantness, weakness making it harder to do things, risk of death, etc.). If that were not true about eating properly, then people might not prioritize it in the first place. If we could make it so that people didnโt need to eat to avoid being worse off in important ways, all else equal, that would be better.
Yeah. The question is whether these intuitions are still covered by something we may call: preference utilitarianism.
They should be, under preference-affecting preference utilitarianism or negative preference utilitarianism (which is antifrustrationist), or possibly for more indirect or contingent reasons, any form of preference utilitarianism.
Can this also be classified along these criteria by Kaj Sotala?