I don’t think it’s necessarily true that you hold no preferences while you are unconscious (and not dreaming), which seems to be what you’re suggesting. The preferences are still probably encoded in your brain somewhere, either explicitly, or as a general response tendency.
“And wouldn’t such a view have the unfair consequence that it is much less important to cure a lonely person about whom no other people care than a popular person about whom lots of people care, even if those are not informed about the cured illness?”
Is it more unfair because they aren’t informed? I think it’s already unfair if they are informed. I think this only seems worse if you assume the conclusion that if you never find out, it shouldn’t matter.
To be clear, though, I think it’s very plausible preferences matter more if you’re informed about their extent of satisfaction, because the experience of satisfaction or frustration matters, too.
Yeah, preferences may still be latent dispositions in case of unconsciousness, but the same seems plausible for Parfit’s forgotten stranger. If he is reminded of them, his preference may come back. So the two cases don’t seem very different.
Is it more unfair because they aren’t informed? I think it’s already unfair if they are informed. I think this only seems worse if you assume the conclusion that if you never find out, it shouldn’t matter.
Well, it is presumably less unfair if they are informed, because it would make them happy to learn that the person is cured, which matters, at least somewhat. And yes, my (and Parfit’s) intuition is that if they never find out that the person was cured, this would not be good for the carers. So curing the cared-about person would not be better than curing the person about whom no one else cares. That’s not a conclusion, it’s a more a premiss for those who share this intuition.
I don’t think it’s necessarily true that you hold no preferences while you are unconscious (and not dreaming), which seems to be what you’re suggesting. The preferences are still probably encoded in your brain somewhere, either explicitly, or as a general response tendency.
“And wouldn’t such a view have the unfair consequence that it is much less important to cure a lonely person about whom no other people care than a popular person about whom lots of people care, even if those are not informed about the cured illness?”
Is it more unfair because they aren’t informed? I think it’s already unfair if they are informed. I think this only seems worse if you assume the conclusion that if you never find out, it shouldn’t matter.
To be clear, though, I think it’s very plausible preferences matter more if you’re informed about their extent of satisfaction, because the experience of satisfaction or frustration matters, too.
Yeah, preferences may still be latent dispositions in case of unconsciousness, but the same seems plausible for Parfit’s forgotten stranger. If he is reminded of them, his preference may come back. So the two cases don’t seem very different.
Well, it is presumably less unfair if they are informed, because it would make them happy to learn that the person is cured, which matters, at least somewhat. And yes, my (and Parfit’s) intuition is that if they never find out that the person was cured, this would not be good for the carers. So curing the cared-about person would not be better than curing the person about whom no one else cares. That’s not a conclusion, it’s a more a premiss for those who share this intuition.