âI donât think that, for a given person, existing can be better or worse than not existing. â
Presumably even given this, you wouldnât create a person who would spending their entire life in terrible agony, begging for death. If that can be a bad thing to do even though existing canât be worse than not existing, then why canât it be a good thing to create happy people, even though existing canât be better than not existing?
No I wouldnât create a person who would spend their entire life in agony. But I think the reason many people including myself hold the PAV despite the procreation asymmetry is because we recognise that, in real life, two thing are separate: (1) creating a person; (2) making that person happy. I disagree that (1) alone is good. At best, it is neutral. I only think that (2) is good.
If I were to create a child and abandon it, I do not think that is better than not creating the child in the first place. That is true even if the child ends up being happy for whatever reason (e.g. it ends up being adopted by a great parent).
In contrast, it is indeed possible to create a child who would spend their entire life in agony. In fact, if I created a child and did nothing more, that childâs life would likely be miserable and short. So I see any asymmetric preference to avoid creating unhappy lives, without wanting to create happy lives, as entirely reasonable.
Moreover, I do not think moral realism is correct and see different views of population ethics as being subjective. They depend on each personâs intrinsic values. And no intrinsic values are logical. Logic can help you find ways to achieve your intrinsic values. But it cannot tell you what your intrinsic values should be. Logic is a powerful tool, but it has limits. I think it is important to recognise where logic can helpâand where it canât.
âI donât think that, for a given person, existing can be better or worse than not existing. â
Presumably even given this, you wouldnât create a person who would spending their entire life in terrible agony, begging for death. If that can be a bad thing to do even though existing canât be worse than not existing, then why canât it be a good thing to create happy people, even though existing canât be better than not existing?
No I wouldnât create a person who would spend their entire life in agony. But I think the reason many people including myself hold the PAV despite the procreation asymmetry is because we recognise that, in real life, two thing are separate: (1) creating a person; (2) making that person happy. I disagree that (1) alone is good. At best, it is neutral. I only think that (2) is good.
If I were to create a child and abandon it, I do not think that is better than not creating the child in the first place. That is true even if the child ends up being happy for whatever reason (e.g. it ends up being adopted by a great parent).
In contrast, it is indeed possible to create a child who would spend their entire life in agony. In fact, if I created a child and did nothing more, that childâs life would likely be miserable and short. So I see any asymmetric preference to avoid creating unhappy lives, without wanting to create happy lives, as entirely reasonable.
Moreover, I do not think moral realism is correct and see different views of population ethics as being subjective. They depend on each personâs intrinsic values. And no intrinsic values are logical. Logic can help you find ways to achieve your intrinsic values. But it cannot tell you what your intrinsic values should be. Logic is a powerful tool, but it has limits. I think it is important to recognise where logic can helpâand where it canât.