Thanks for your research and for this post! It was a very interesting read. I was just thinking about how to strengthen the case for wild animal welfare, in the spirit of increasing the chances and the solidity of a pragmatic coalition between those who care about wild animals and those who care about restoration ecology.
In this sense I think it would be good for us not to suggest that one needs to be a utilitarian in order to be on board with improving wild animals’ lives. This is mainly for two reasons.
First, you really don’t need to be a utilitarian:
a) Other welfare-centric consequentialist views also entail we have very strong moral reasons to improve wild animals’ lives. For instance, prioritarianism or egalitarianism;
b) Non-consequentialist views can entail that as well. You can embrace a rights-based position or Kantism and still believe that we have a moral obligation to help others in need. More importantly, even if one doesn’t believe such an obligation exists, surely one wants to say that it’s morally permissible, and a good thing, to improve the lives of others, be they human or not.
c) One can derive reasons to intervene in nature and improve wild animals’ lives from non- welfarist axiologies. For example, we may be concerned with enriching wild animals’ choice opportunities. Right now these are very poor, in that their choice situations involve few alternatives and these tend not to be very satisfactory from the point of view of the animals’ preferences. Thus, intervening in nature to help them may be something we’d want to do if we are concerned about their freedom of choice.
Second, most people aren’t utilitarians, consequentialists or welfarists. It seems good strategically to find ways to tap into the moral intuitions.
I hope this is helpful. Again, thanks for the work you do!
1. For what it’s worth, I don’t think Jane was trying to say you have to be a utilitarian to support wild animal welfare. I interpreted her comment as mostly referring to the intellectual history of the wild animal welfare movement, which does seem to have its roots primarily in utilitarianism.
2. One of my favorite illustrations of a non-consequentialist/non-welfarist rationale for improving wild animal welfare (backing up your points b and c) is “Legal Personhood and the Positive Rights of Wild Animals” (Jay Shooster 2017). Well worth checking out if you haven’t already!
It seems to me that the piece you linked (which is great) does not exactly make a non-consequentialist/non-welfarist case for improving wild animal welfare. Rather, it claims that if we reject speciesism and believe (on whatever moral grounds) that there should be positive legal obligations towards humans, then we must conclude that there should be similar legal obligations towards animals as well.
I think that the most complete rendering of that line of reasoning for our moral (rather than legal) obligation to intervene in nature on behalf of wild animals can be found in Catia Faria’s 2014 doctoral dissertation.
Hi!
Thanks for your research and for this post! It was a very interesting read. I was just thinking about how to strengthen the case for wild animal welfare, in the spirit of increasing the chances and the solidity of a pragmatic coalition between those who care about wild animals and those who care about restoration ecology.
In this sense I think it would be good for us not to suggest that one needs to be a utilitarian in order to be on board with improving wild animals’ lives. This is mainly for two reasons.
First, you really don’t need to be a utilitarian:
a) Other welfare-centric consequentialist views also entail we have very strong moral reasons to
improve wild animals’ lives. For instance, prioritarianism or egalitarianism;
b) Non-consequentialist views can entail that as well. You can embrace a rights-based position
or Kantism and still believe that we have a moral obligation to help others in need. More
importantly, even if one doesn’t believe such an obligation exists, surely one wants to say that
it’s morally permissible, and a good thing, to improve the lives of others, be they human or not.
c) One can derive reasons to intervene in nature and improve wild animals’ lives from non-
welfarist axiologies. For example, we may be concerned with enriching wild animals’ choice
opportunities. Right now these are very poor, in that their choice situations involve few
alternatives and these tend not to be very satisfactory from the point of view of the animals’
preferences. Thus, intervening in nature to help them may be something we’d want to do if we
are concerned about their freedom of choice.
Second, most people aren’t utilitarians, consequentialists or welfarists. It seems good strategically to find ways to tap into the moral intuitions.
I hope this is helpful. Again, thanks for the work you do!
Great point, Eze Paez! I’m glad you added it.
1. For what it’s worth, I don’t think Jane was trying to say you have to be a utilitarian to support wild animal welfare. I interpreted her comment as mostly referring to the intellectual history of the wild animal welfare movement, which does seem to have its roots primarily in utilitarianism.
2. One of my favorite illustrations of a non-consequentialist/non-welfarist rationale for improving wild animal welfare (backing up your points b and c) is “Legal Personhood and the Positive Rights of Wild Animals” (Jay Shooster 2017). Well worth checking out if you haven’t already!
Thanks, Cameron!
It seems to me that the piece you linked (which is great) does not exactly make a non-consequentialist/non-welfarist case for improving wild animal welfare. Rather, it claims that if we reject speciesism and believe (on whatever moral grounds) that there should be positive legal obligations towards humans, then we must conclude that there should be similar legal obligations towards animals as well.
I think that the most complete rendering of that line of reasoning for our moral (rather than legal) obligation to intervene in nature on behalf of wild animals can be found in Catia Faria’s 2014 doctoral dissertation.
Cheers!
Agreed! I appreciate the correction.
Thanks for sharing Catia’s dissertation! I hadn’t seen that before and I’m looking forward to reading it.