You argue that the value added by saving a life is separable into two categories:
Person-directed: The value added by positively affecting an existing person’s interests.
Undirected: The value added simply by increasing the total amount of happy life lived.
Let’s define the “coefficient of undirected value” C between 0 and 1 to be the proportion of value added for undirected reasons, as opposed to person-directed reasons. The totalist view would set C=1, arguing that there is no intrinsic value to helping a particular person. The person-affecting view would set C=0, arguing that it is only coherent to add value when it positively affects an existing person. You argue that this is a false dichotomy, and that C should be “low,” i.e. giving low moral weight to interventions which only produce undirected value (e.g. increasing fertility) relative to interventions which produce both categories of value (e.g. saving a life).
I think the totalist view should be lent more credence than you lend it in your post, and that C should be adjusted upwards accordingly by moral uncertainty to be “high.” I would endorse the implication that causing a baby to be born who otherwise would not is “close to as good” as saving a life.
Consider choosing between the following situations (in the vein of your post’s discussion of the intrinsic harm of death):
A woman wants a child. You use your instant artificial womb to create an infant for her.
A woman just gave birth to an infant. The infant is about to painlessly die due to a genetic defect. You prevent that death.
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that the woman’s interests are identical in both cases. (i.e. the sadness Woman 1 would have had if you didn’t make her a child is the same as the sadness Woman 2 would have had if her child painlessly died, and the happiness of both women from being able to raise their child is the same.)
To me, it seems most intuitive that one should have little to no preference between Case 1 and Case 2. The outcomes for both the woman and the child are (by construction) identical. Of course, the value added in Case 1 is undirected, since the child doesn’t yet exist for its interests to be positively affected by your decision, and the value added in Case 2 includes both directed and undirected components. If we follow this intuition, we must conclude that C=1, or C is very close to 1. Even if you still have a significant intuitive preference for Case 2, let’s say you’re choosing between two occurrences of Case 1 and one occurrence of Case 2. Many now would switch to prefer the two occurrences of Case 1, since now we have two happy mothers and children versus one. However, this still implies C>0.5. If we accept the idea that Case 1 is close to as good as Case 2, then it seems hard to escape the conclusion that C is “high,” and we should adjust the way we think about increasing fertility accordingly.
I should clarify that I’m not committed to C being “low”; but I do think it should be somewhere between 0 and 1 (rather than at either extreme). I don’t have any objection to C>0.5, for example, though I expect many people would find it more intuitive to place it somewhat lower. I’d probably be most comfortable somewhere around 0.5 myself, but I have very wide uncertainty on this, and could probably easily be swayed anywhere in the range from 0.2 − 0.8 or so. It seems a really hard question!
To me, it seems most intuitive that one should have little to no preference between Case 1 and Case 2. The outcomes for both the woman and the child are (by construction) identical.
My thought is that what we (should) care about may vary between the cases, and change over time (as new people come into existence). Roughly, the intuition is that we should care especially about individuals who do or will exist (independently of our present actions). So once a child exists (or will exist), we may have just as much reason to be thankful for their creation as we do for their life being saved; so I agree the two options don’t differ in retrospect. But in prospect, we have (somewhat) less reason to bring a new person into existence than to save an already-existing person. And I take the “in prospect” perspective to be the one that’s more decision-relevant.
You argue that the value added by saving a life is separable into two categories:
Person-directed: The value added by positively affecting an existing person’s interests.
Undirected: The value added simply by increasing the total amount of happy life lived.
Let’s define the “coefficient of undirected value” C between 0 and 1 to be the proportion of value added for undirected reasons, as opposed to person-directed reasons. The totalist view would set C=1, arguing that there is no intrinsic value to helping a particular person. The person-affecting view would set C=0, arguing that it is only coherent to add value when it positively affects an existing person. You argue that this is a false dichotomy, and that C should be “low,” i.e. giving low moral weight to interventions which only produce undirected value (e.g. increasing fertility) relative to interventions which produce both categories of value (e.g. saving a life).
I think the totalist view should be lent more credence than you lend it in your post, and that C should be adjusted upwards accordingly by moral uncertainty to be “high.” I would endorse the implication that causing a baby to be born who otherwise would not is “close to as good” as saving a life.
Consider choosing between the following situations (in the vein of your post’s discussion of the intrinsic harm of death):
A woman wants a child. You use your instant artificial womb to create an infant for her.
A woman just gave birth to an infant. The infant is about to painlessly die due to a genetic defect. You prevent that death.
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that the woman’s interests are identical in both cases. (i.e. the sadness Woman 1 would have had if you didn’t make her a child is the same as the sadness Woman 2 would have had if her child painlessly died, and the happiness of both women from being able to raise their child is the same.)
To me, it seems most intuitive that one should have little to no preference between Case 1 and Case 2. The outcomes for both the woman and the child are (by construction) identical. Of course, the value added in Case 1 is undirected, since the child doesn’t yet exist for its interests to be positively affected by your decision, and the value added in Case 2 includes both directed and undirected components. If we follow this intuition, we must conclude that C=1, or C is very close to 1. Even if you still have a significant intuitive preference for Case 2, let’s say you’re choosing between two occurrences of Case 1 and one occurrence of Case 2. Many now would switch to prefer the two occurrences of Case 1, since now we have two happy mothers and children versus one. However, this still implies C>0.5. If we accept the idea that Case 1 is close to as good as Case 2, then it seems hard to escape the conclusion that C is “high,” and we should adjust the way we think about increasing fertility accordingly.
Let me know what you think!
Interesting! Thanks for this.
I should clarify that I’m not committed to C being “low”; but I do think it should be somewhere between 0 and 1 (rather than at either extreme). I don’t have any objection to C>0.5, for example, though I expect many people would find it more intuitive to place it somewhat lower. I’d probably be most comfortable somewhere around 0.5 myself, but I have very wide uncertainty on this, and could probably easily be swayed anywhere in the range from 0.2 − 0.8 or so. It seems a really hard question!
My thought is that what we (should) care about may vary between the cases, and change over time (as new people come into existence). Roughly, the intuition is that we should care especially about individuals who do or will exist (independently of our present actions). So once a child exists (or will exist), we may have just as much reason to be thankful for their creation as we do for their life being saved; so I agree the two options don’t differ in retrospect. But in prospect, we have (somewhat) less reason to bring a new person into existence than to save an already-existing person. And I take the “in prospect” perspective to be the one that’s more decision-relevant.
Thanks for the clarification, and for your explanation of your thought process!