Interesting that one of the two main hypotheses advanced in that paper is that media is influencing public opinion, but the media is not the internet, but TV!
The rise of 24-hour partisan cable news provides another potential explanation. Partisan cable networks emerged during the period we study and arguably played a much larger role in the US than elsewhere, though this may be in part a consequence rather than a cause of growing affective polarization.9 Older demographic groups also consume more partisan cable news and have polarized more quickly than younger demographic groups in the US (Boxell et al. 2017; Martin and Yurukoglu 2017). Interestingly, the five countries with a negative linear slope for affective polarization all devote more public funds per capita to public service broadcast media than three of the countries with a positive slope (Benson and Powers 2011, Table 1; see also Benson et al. 2017). A role for partisan cable news is also consistent with visual evidence (see Figure 1) of an acceleration of the growth in affective polarization in the US following the mid-1990s, which saw the launch of Fox News and MSNBC.
(The other hypothesis is “party sorting”, wherein people move to parties that align more in ideology and social identity.)
Perhaps campaigning for more money to PBS or somehow countering Fox and MSNBC could be really important for US-democracy.
Also, if TV has been so influential, it also suggests that even if online media isn’t yet influential on the population-scale, it may be influential for smaller groups of people, and that it will be extremely influential in the future.
Some argue, however, that partisan TV and radio was helped by the abolition of the FCC fairness doctrine in 1987. That amounts to saying that polarisation was driven at least partly by legal changes rather than by technological innovations.
Obviously media influences public opinion. But the question is whether specific media technologies (e.g. social media vs TV vs radio vs newspapers) cause more or less polarisation, fake news, partisanship, filter bubbles, and so on. That’s a difficult empirical question, since all those things can no doubt be mediated to some degree through each of these media technologies.
Interesting that one of the two main hypotheses advanced in that paper is that media is influencing public opinion, but the media is not the internet, but TV!
(The other hypothesis is “party sorting”, wherein people move to parties that align more in ideology and social identity.)
Perhaps campaigning for more money to PBS or somehow countering Fox and MSNBC could be really important for US-democracy.
Also, if TV has been so influential, it also suggests that even if online media isn’t yet influential on the population-scale, it may be influential for smaller groups of people, and that it will be extremely influential in the future.
Some argue, however, that partisan TV and radio was helped by the abolition of the FCC fairness doctrine in 1987. That amounts to saying that polarisation was driven at least partly by legal changes rather than by technological innovations.
Obviously media influences public opinion. But the question is whether specific media technologies (e.g. social media vs TV vs radio vs newspapers) cause more or less polarisation, fake news, partisanship, filter bubbles, and so on. That’s a difficult empirical question, since all those things can no doubt be mediated to some degree through each of these media technologies.