An interesting question I have regarding offsetting is whether it should just be measuring the negative aspects of contributing to animal suffering by increasing demand for factory farmed products, or whether it should also be considering the positives avoided by not being vegan (signaling value, increasing the demand for vegan products, other possible things).
Because if one were considering whether or not to be vegan or to donate $X dollars, they should probably consider the full counterfactual (positives foregone as well as negatives caused).
I agree. But current offsetting focuses on just negating the negatives.
The reason not to is it may accord more with the psychological reasons for offsetting to focus on just the harm negation. The measure weâre discussing may go beyond what makes sense to call âoffsettingâ.
Thanks. To be clear, is your original question asking about a) whether the animal movement should take into account the positives avoided by offsetting non-veganism when deciding whether or not to promote offsetting to non-vegans, or b) whether the animal movement should tell non-vegans about the positives avoided by offsetting?
I think definitely yes to a), and we shouldnât lead with it whilst remaining transparent for b).
I agree that the animal movement, individually, and collectively, should take into account the entire counterfactual difference between someone being vegan and someone being an omnivore. This would include the harm caused by being an omnivore by increasing the demand for factory farmed meat as well as the absence of positive effects of being a vegan (such as normalizing being vegan and increasing demand for vegan products). Ideally, in deciding oneâs dietary choices, one who was concerned with animal welfare would consider the the harm avoided by being vegan and the good that is caused. They would then quantify the cost for animal welfare charities to both commensurately decrease the harm caused and effectuate the good that is not realized. This would probably a better measure and one could say, âOK Iâm donating 10% to effective charities already. Is it easier for me to pay the cost of the whole counterfactual difference in addition to this which I would otherwise donate? Or is it easier for me to be vegan?â
The other frame for offsetting, however, would be to make it match the psychological appeal of undoing the harm one caused. If this is what is motivating people to donate to animal welfare charities, then it would make more sense to only include the harms that are caused by being an omnivore (i.e., contributing demand for factory-farmed meat). People may not feel morally obligated to make the positive difference, just not to cause the harm (or to undo it).
So, definitely for decision making of individuals and within the movement, considering the positives as well as the negatives avoided of veganism is important. Whether having âoffsettingâ include it is a prudential question that would really depend on the psychologies that cause people to offset.
If weâre going to promote offsetting, I reckon these kinds of considerations will not be interesting to the vast majority of the target audience, and they wouldnât expect to have them explained. Just do the maths, taking into account positives avoided as well as negatives caused, and tell people how much they need to donate to offset those impacts of their non-veganism.
(I say this as someone who is pretty sceptical of offsetting non-veganism, for both moral/âdeontologically-flavoured reasons and strategic/âconsequentialist ones.)
It might make sense to have the ability to toggle a âharm negationâ and a âtotal counterfactual expected differenceâ calculation. But youâre right that a lot of people who offsetting might appeal to may not want to investigate these distinctions.
An interesting question I have regarding offsetting is whether it should just be measuring the negative aspects of contributing to animal suffering by increasing demand for factory farmed products, or whether it should also be considering the positives avoided by not being vegan (signaling value, increasing the demand for vegan products, other possible things).
Because if one were considering whether or not to be vegan or to donate $X dollars, they should probably consider the full counterfactual (positives foregone as well as negatives caused).
I think itâs very important we (try to) consider the full counterfactual â whatâs the reason not to?
I agree. But current offsetting focuses on just negating the negatives.
The reason not to is it may accord more with the psychological reasons for offsetting to focus on just the harm negation. The measure weâre discussing may go beyond what makes sense to call âoffsettingâ.
Thanks. To be clear, is your original question asking about a) whether the animal movement should take into account the positives avoided by offsetting non-veganism when deciding whether or not to promote offsetting to non-vegans, or b) whether the animal movement should tell non-vegans about the positives avoided by offsetting?
I think definitely yes to a), and we shouldnât lead with it whilst remaining transparent for b).
Sorry if I havenât been clear.
I agree that the animal movement, individually, and collectively, should take into account the entire counterfactual difference between someone being vegan and someone being an omnivore. This would include the harm caused by being an omnivore by increasing the demand for factory farmed meat as well as the absence of positive effects of being a vegan (such as normalizing being vegan and increasing demand for vegan products). Ideally, in deciding oneâs dietary choices, one who was concerned with animal welfare would consider the the harm avoided by being vegan and the good that is caused. They would then quantify the cost for animal welfare charities to both commensurately decrease the harm caused and effectuate the good that is not realized. This would probably a better measure and one could say, âOK Iâm donating 10% to effective charities already. Is it easier for me to pay the cost of the whole counterfactual difference in addition to this which I would otherwise donate? Or is it easier for me to be vegan?â
The other frame for offsetting, however, would be to make it match the psychological appeal of undoing the harm one caused. If this is what is motivating people to donate to animal welfare charities, then it would make more sense to only include the harms that are caused by being an omnivore (i.e., contributing demand for factory-farmed meat). People may not feel morally obligated to make the positive difference, just not to cause the harm (or to undo it).
So, definitely for decision making of individuals and within the movement, considering the positives as well as the negatives avoided of veganism is important. Whether having âoffsettingâ include it is a prudential question that would really depend on the psychologies that cause people to offset.
Nice, got it.
If weâre going to promote offsetting, I reckon these kinds of considerations will not be interesting to the vast majority of the target audience, and they wouldnât expect to have them explained. Just do the maths, taking into account positives avoided as well as negatives caused, and tell people how much they need to donate to offset those impacts of their non-veganism.
(I say this as someone who is pretty sceptical of offsetting non-veganism, for both moral/âdeontologically-flavoured reasons and strategic/âconsequentialist ones.)
It might make sense to have the ability to toggle a âharm negationâ and a âtotal counterfactual expected differenceâ calculation. But youâre right that a lot of people who offsetting might appeal to may not want to investigate these distinctions.