Forecasting is a dangerous activity, particularly because it is a fun, game-like activity that is nearly perfectly designed to be very attractive to EA/ārationalist types because you get to be right when others are wrong, bet on your beliefs, and partake in the cultural practice.
I like betsinvolving donations, and investments as alternatives to forecasting without money on the line.
Thatās still a sort of game/ācultural thing rather than a means for more positive impact, though. Iāve seen that around EA basically forever, but I donāt think people who bet on their beliefs have been āmore rightā than those who donāt.
Hi Guy. The bets would be directly beneficial if people who are more accurate donate to more cost-effective interventions? In addition, I wonder whether the discussions of bets involving donations, and investments could have higher quality than ones of forecasting questions without money on the line. The prospects of winning or losing money usually leads to people investigating their views more.
The prospects of winning or losing money usually leads to people investigating their views more.
That seems to be a general cultural view in EA, but what Iām saying is that Iāve yet to see any evidence these bets actually help. I think the notion is unfounded.
My understanding is that there is an extensive body of evidence that people become more rational and put in more cognitive effort when there are real-money stakes involved; but I would welcome commentary from someone more familiar with the literature.
Hi Guy and Ian. To clarify, I have in mind bets which involve winning or losing amounts of money of at least 1 % of the net annual income, and ideally at least 10 %. For example, for some earning 30 k$ of net income per year, at least 300 $ (= 0.01*30*10^3), and ideally at least 3 k$ (= 0.1*30*10^3). For a sufficiently large amount of money at stake, people would either not accept the bet, or accept it after significant investigation.
I like bets involving donations, and investments as alternatives to forecasting without money on the line.
Thatās still a sort of game/ācultural thing rather than a means for more positive impact, though. Iāve seen that around EA basically forever, but I donāt think people who bet on their beliefs have been āmore rightā than those who donāt.
Hi Guy. The bets would be directly beneficial if people who are more accurate donate to more cost-effective interventions? In addition, I wonder whether the discussions of bets involving donations, and investments could have higher quality than ones of forecasting questions without money on the line. The prospects of winning or losing money usually leads to people investigating their views more.
That seems to be a general cultural view in EA, but what Iām saying is that Iāve yet to see any evidence these bets actually help. I think the notion is unfounded.
My understanding is that there is an extensive body of evidence that people become more rational and put in more cognitive effort when there are real-money stakes involved; but I would welcome commentary from someone more familiar with the literature.
Hi Guy and Ian. To clarify, I have in mind bets which involve winning or losing amounts of money of at least 1 % of the net annual income, and ideally at least 10 %. For example, for some earning 30 k$ of net income per year, at least 300 $ (= 0.01*30*10^3), and ideally at least 3 k$ (= 0.1*30*10^3). For a sufficiently large amount of money at stake, people would either not accept the bet, or accept it after significant investigation.
This is widely believed to be true outside effective altruism too.