When talking about forecasting, people often ask questions like âHow can we leverage forecasting into better decisions?â This is the wrong way to go about solving problems. You solve problems by starting with the problem, and then you see which tools are useful for solving it.
I definitely have my own gripes about EA/ârationalist attitudes towards forecasting (see here), but maybe your objection is a level confusion:
I think when people talk about âleveraging forecasting into better decisionsâ, theyâre saying: ââBetterâ decisions just are decisions guided by the normatively correct beliefs. Namely, theyâre decisions that make reasonable-seeming tradeoffs between possible outcomes given the normatively correct beliefs about the plausibility of those outcomes. So our decisions will be more aligned with this standard of âbetterâ if our beliefs are formed by deferring to well-calibrated forecasts.â
E.g. theyâre saying, âWhen navigating AI risk, weâll make decisions that we endorse more if those decisions are guided by the credences of folks whoâve been unusually successful at forecasting AI developments.â
(At least, thatâs the steelman. Maybe Iâm being too charitable!)
Whereas you seem to be asking something like: âWe already know which beliefs are reasonable. Do these beliefs tell us that âplug forecasts into some decision-making procedureâ seems likely to lead to good outcomes (i.e., that this is a âuseful toolâ)?â
(My gripes discussed in the linked post above, FWIW: Re: (1), the typical EA operationalization of âwell-calibratedâ, and judgments about how to defer to people based on their calibration on some reference class of past questions, are based on very questionable epistemological assumptions. See also this great post.)
I definitely have my own gripes about EA/ârationalist attitudes towards forecasting (see here), but maybe your objection is a level confusion:
I think when people talk about âleveraging forecasting into better decisionsâ, theyâre saying: ââBetterâ decisions just are decisions guided by the normatively correct beliefs. Namely, theyâre decisions that make reasonable-seeming tradeoffs between possible outcomes given the normatively correct beliefs about the plausibility of those outcomes. So our decisions will be more aligned with this standard of âbetterâ if our beliefs are formed by deferring to well-calibrated forecasts.â
E.g. theyâre saying, âWhen navigating AI risk, weâll make decisions that we endorse more if those decisions are guided by the credences of folks whoâve been unusually successful at forecasting AI developments.â
(At least, thatâs the steelman. Maybe Iâm being too charitable!)
Whereas you seem to be asking something like: âWe already know which beliefs are reasonable. Do these beliefs tell us that âplug forecasts into some decision-making procedureâ seems likely to lead to good outcomes (i.e., that this is a âuseful toolâ)?â
(My gripes discussed in the linked post above, FWIW: Re: (1), the typical EA operationalization of âwell-calibratedâ, and judgments about how to defer to people based on their calibration on some reference class of past questions, are based on very questionable epistemological assumptions. See also this great post.)