Minding Our Way by Nate Soares comes close, although I don’t think he addresses the “what if there actually exist moral obligations?” question, instead assuming mostly non-moral-realism)
Not sure what he says (haven’t got the interest to search through a whole series of posts for the relevant ones, sorry) but my point assuming antirealism (or subjectivism) seems to have been generally neglected by philosophy both inside and outside the academia: just because the impartial good isn’t everything doesn’t mean that it is rational to generically promote other people’s pursuits of their own respective partial goods. The whole reason humans created impartial morality in the first place is that we realized that it works better than for us to each pursue partialist goals.
So, regardless of most moral points of view, the shared standards and norms around how-much-to-sacrifice must be justified on consequentialist grounds.
I should emphasize that antirealism != agent-relative morality, I just happen to think that there is a correlation in plausibility here.
Not sure what he says (haven’t got the interest to search through a whole series of posts for the relevant ones, sorry) but my point assuming antirealism (or subjectivism) seems to have been generally neglected by philosophy both inside and outside the academia: just because the impartial good isn’t everything doesn’t mean that it is rational to generically promote other people’s pursuits of their own respective partial goods. The whole reason humans created impartial morality in the first place is that we realized that it works better than for us to each pursue partialist goals.
So, regardless of most moral points of view, the shared standards and norms around how-much-to-sacrifice must be justified on consequentialist grounds.
I should emphasize that antirealism != agent-relative morality, I just happen to think that there is a correlation in plausibility here.