Thx for your perspective; I should be upfront that my confidence in my own case is far from ironclad. Anyway.
From the ryan_greenblatt’s article you’ve linked, I think safety plan A, based on achieving international agreement, should be tried before going for plan B, based on achieving and using a secure US lead, while in “plans” C and D it doesn’t matter whether the leading company is American or Chinese, so slowing down Chinese development is useless for those “plans” (they are in fact more like scenarios than real plans).
I do agree that the US political system is in an important sense better than the Chinese political system, but my prior is that if superintelligence is developed before, let’s say, 2050 (and that is very optimistic), it is likely to go badly completely regardless of which country it’ll come from.
I take your point about slack being potentially useful. Theoretically, I can imagine the following sequence of events: a) the US AI industry crushes Chinese competition, then b) the US government, feeling secure in the US lead, imposes sensible safety regulation on companies. If it were smart about it, it would at the same time propose an international regulatory framework that the rest of the world would be prepared to sign on to, as an alternative to unrestrained US domination. In effect, this would be tantamount to getting so much leverage over China that they would drop out of the race, and then hoping that the US government would use its advantage to push for safety, instead of using it in some other way.
However, imho this is a plan that should be pursued as a first option only in circumstances where you are really confident it’ll work, since the consequences of trying and failing are likely to be dire, as per my original post. And I am not confident it will work.
A much better order of operations would be to 1) try to negotiate with China to establish an international regulatory framework (plan A), with export control and other stuff being imposed as something that is explicitly linked to China not agreeing to that framework, in the same way sanctions on Russia are imposed explicitly because its aggression against Ukraine, and 2) only if they refuse, try to crush them (plan B).
When political will in the US to try for plan A is lacking, I think waiting until circumstances make that plan realistic while preparing the groundwork for it is a better strategy than going straight ahead for plan B.
“But I think maybe the cruxiest bits are (a) I think export controls seem great in Plan B/C worlds, which seem much likelier than Plan A worlds, and (b) I think unilaterally easing export controls is unlikely to substantially affect the likelihood of Plan A happening (all else equal). It seems like you disagree with both, or at least with (b)?”
Yep, this is pretty close to my views. I do disagree with (b), since I am afraid that controls might poison the well for future Plan A negotiations. As for (a), I don’t get how controls help with Plan C, and I don’t think Plan B/C worlds are much more likely than Plan A, as of now. But I do agree with you that controls help with Plan B, so if you see it as the main hope, I understand why you are supporting them.
(btw. how does one do a proper blockqoute here?)