forgive the self-promotion but hereâs a related Facebook post I made:
The law of conservation of expected evidence, E(E(X|Y)) = E(X), essentially states that you canât âexpect to change your mindâ, in the sense that, if you already thought that your estimate of (say) some interventionâs cost-effectiveness would go up by an average of Z after reading this study, then your EV should already have been Z higher before you read it. You should be balanced (in EV terms) between the possible outcomes that would be positive surprises and negative surprises, otherwise youâre just not calculating your EVs correctly.
Anyway, letâs take X to be global future welfare, and Y to be the consequences of some action you take. E(E(X|Y)) = E(X) means that the average global well-being given the outcome of your action is exactly the same as the average global well-being without the outcome of your action. So why did you bother doing it?
I think we have an empirical disagreement here. If I felt strongly motivated to try to persuade you about this, I would go try to find studies about it; I suspect we may not even have 90% agreement on âeveryone alive today is worthy of moral concernâ, and I would strongly guess we donât have that level of agreement on caring about people who will be born 50 years from now. (Although I would also guess that many people just donât think about this kind of question very much and arenât guaranteed to have very clear or consistent answers.)
Even if people agreed with the premises, we could try to justify longtermism as arguing that the consequences of this belief are underexplored, though I hear you that you donât see a lot of neglected consequences.
At this point, though, Iâm not actually that invested in trying to champion longtermism specifically, so Iâm not the right person to defend it to you here. Letâs fix x-risk and check in about it after that :)