I’m a biosecurity researcher at Gryphon Scientific with a background in behavioral science and education research ~
Daniel Greene
Karma: 102
Laboratory Biorisk Management Needs More Social Scientists
Do you think that raising life scientists’ awareness about the potential dual-use risks of their work is net-positive, because they can mitigate those risks, or net-negative, because they will draw the attention of bad actors?
One well-done example of a “dual-use scanning tool” is the Dual-Use Quickscan, developed by the Netherlands Biosecurity Office.
My employer Gryphon Scientific (a US-based biosecurity consultancy) has actively worked on this topic for a while. Feel free to send me a private message if interested.
EA Santa Cruz welcome brunch
+1 to this. arXiv could play a big role in contributing to a norm around not publishing dual use bio research. There are challenges of screening large numbers of papers, but they can be met. See here for an example from ASM. bioRxiv may or may not be screening already, but they aren’t sharing information about their practices. It would be helpful if they were more vocal about the importance of not publishing dangerous information.
RAND and Gryphon Scientific are in the process of writing up an experiment comparing the ability of red teams to develop bioterrorism plans using traditional internet search vs. LLMs-plus-internet. Hopefully this will soon improve the state of the evidence!