There was something interesting I observed about myself: I have tried replacing reading the news by reading more relevant articles a number of times—and I have failed just as many times. This made me realize that reading the news fulfils a certain purpose in my daily life and it is not information consumption. Rather it is: winding down, entertainment, etc. I usually read the news when having lunch. And when I tried intentionally reading something valuable (yes, I am thoroughly convinced that reading the news is hardly valuable) didn’t deliver the same kind of reprieve.
dominicroser
Karma: 357
There is an essay on Buddhism and Effective Altruism by Calvin Baker.
I sincerely hope this cause will be taken as seriously as possible and thoroughly examined.
On an anecdotal basis, I have been repeatedly surprised just how many people around me have had significant experiences along these lines. I would never have guessed this before my friends all were in child-bearing age.
I also think the relevance of this cause area might typically remain hidden from public sight because:less than half the population ever gives birth
most people who do give birth, do so only once or very few times during their life
if something goes wrong, they are in a uniquely bad position to follow-up given that life with a small child is a uniquely intense phase
We should also naturally be open to the idea that OV happens much more frequently than assumed given that
birthing persons are in a uniquely vulnerable situation
health and safety concerns - even if well-intentioned—always provide a plausible cover/excuse
It is so helpful to have this overview assesment in concentrated form.
In public debates about the pros & cons of economic growth in rich countries there is often the idea “Growth in rich countries is unimportant/bad—but, yes, for poor countries it is important to still grow”.
The kind of work you portray about spillovers puts the viability of the idea “growth in poor countries without growth in rich countries” into question and helpfully puts numbers on how strongly growth in rich countries is linked to growth in poor countries.
Share these links with Christian friends interested in EA
A paper that Kian Mintz-Woo is working on is relevant: “Incentives for the Long-Term(ist)”
From the abstract: “To address long-term externalities, I propose internalizing long-term externalized costs: according to our best estimates of the long-term costs of an activity or product, this cost should be added.”
You would have to ask him directly where he’s currently at with his draft.
Many people—both in academia and policymaking—consider the concept of ‘Knightian Uncertainty’ (roughly, the absence of probabilities for decision-making) to be highly relevant (eg for the purpose of spelling out precautionary principles). Does the concept make sense? If not, is it a problem that many people find it practically relevant?
Looking for help: what’s the opposite of counterfactual reasoning—in other words: when EAs encourage counterfactual reasoning, what do they discourage?
I ask because I’m writing about good epistemic practices and mindsets. I am trying to structure my writing as a list of opposites (scout mindset vs soldier mindset, numerical vs verbal reasoning, etc).
Would it be correct to say that in the case of counterfactual reasoning there is no real opposite? Rather, the appropriate contrast is: “counterfactual reasoning done well vs. counterfactual reasoning done badly”?
dominicroser’s Quick takes
Thank you so much—this is the most helpful text I’ve read about this question!
I’d love it if someone were to write—
an equally detailed post about developing countries (rather than just something the length of section 4.4)
-- summarized how well it’s possible to boost growth in developing countries without doing so in developed countries.
The thought is that the best case for economic growth leading to happiness would be along the following lines (excluding the link between growth and catastrophic/existential risk):
- growth doesn’t hurt happiness in rich countries
- growth promotes happiness in poor countries
- growth in poor countries isn’t possible without growth in rich countries
Brian Green, the author of the epilogue, has contributed to EA for Christians in a number of helpful ways in the past (eg https://youtu.be/L3q6C-JzIyA)
Etwas mit “Ganzzeitdenken”, “Gesamtzukunftsdenken”, “Vollfristdenken”?
Das sind keine konkreten Vorschläge, sondern mehr Brainstorming. Etwas was ja Longtermism von Mainstream-Aufrufen zu mehr langfristigem Denken unterscheidet ist der Fokus auf der gesamten Zukunft (statt “nur” auf den nächsten 100 Jahren).
There are chapters here on Buddhism, Orthodox Judaism and Christianity in this book on religion and EA.
I think there is a simple reason why EA is compatible with many moral views: increasing welfare is an important element of any sensible moral view. Utilitarianism is just the view that this is the only element that matters. But any other sensible moral view will acknowledge that increasing welfare matters at least alongside other considerations.
Plus: the element of increasing welfare has become more important in the past 3-4 decades since our opportunities for increasing welfare have increased a lot compared to the previous history of humanity. Thus, the ‘utilitarian element’ of any sensible moral view has become practically more relevant in the past 3-4 decades. And since EA helps us to exploit these opportunities, EA matters according to any sensible moral view.
One thing to keep in mind: for most people the point of a gift is not to transfer an economic resource to you but to express something about the relationship they have with you (and they’re willing for this expression to cost something; and, generally, we’re willing as a society for this expression to come with economic inefficiencies: often, the giver chooses a gift (though less so at weddings) and the giver has much less information about the preferences of the receiver than the receiver).
I think gift-giving is a psychologically tricky issue. I also think one shouldn’t downplay the symbolic value in gifts—rather, one should see the economic costs of a gift as a necessary cost for creating the symbolic value (rather than primarily as a cost for making a new coffee machine stand in the receiver’s kitchen).
I just say this because often, donations to charity aren’t a full substitute for a gift to the receiver: they don’t fully create the same symbolic meaning. (I’d actually love to see a more general discussion of this: many EAs create fundraisers for their birthdays and I, personally, think such fundraisers partly miss the point of gift-giving)
[Pre-remark: I have only lightly skimmed the post]
Just wanted to add a pointer to Tim Mulgan’s book Ethics for a Broken World -- given the similarity in framing: “Imagine living in the future in a world already damaged by humankind...Then imagine looking back into the past, back to our own time and assessing the ethics of the early twenty-first century. ….This book is presented as a series of history of philosophy lectures given in the future, studying the classic texts from a past age of affluence, our own time. ”
I’ve given a number of small talks about effective donations to various non-EA audiences. In the end—after having made my case for focusing on effectiveness in giving—I encouraged them and said: “If my argument convinced you, how about making a start and using half of your next batch of donations for the most effective charities.”
Do you see any problem in taking your research as evidence that this might be sensible advice? I know Giving Multiplier does something different. However, I wonder whether it’s similar enough to be transferable?
New Publication: Effective Altruism and Religion
There was a somewhat unusual short philosophical paper this year signed by lots of philosophers which claimed that avoidance of the repugnant conclusion should not be seen as a necessary condition for an adequate population ethics. I guess it’s driven by a similar concern you have here: the repugnant conclusion is much less obviously repugnant than its name makes it seem.
I love this post. It singles out a very specific problem and tackles it very thoughtfully.
On website blockers: I have also quitted them regularly but since I have started using ColdTurkey I have quitted much less. I think it’s better than other blockers.
For myself, family life has done the trick of making me go to bed at a reasonable hour. But as soon as my wife and kids are gone for a day or two, I (regrettably!) just stay up forever. One of the reasons why I do so (and which doesn’t come up on your list) is that my mood often happens to be very good when I stay up late and I also enter flow states more easily when working late at night.
I love this post.
BTW, note that there have been two entries on closely related themes for the Cause Exploration Prize: here and here.
I think it is curious that effective altruism doesn’t talk more about friendships or, more broadly, relationships. As far as I understand, relationships are a key determinant of happiness. Also, relationships are one of the first things that come to mind when objective list theorists try to explain to hedonists what might matter in addition to happiness. Relationships thus seem important.
They also seems neglected: I can remember few deliberate policy interventions aimed at promoting good relationships. It might be such a cross-cutting and vague issue that it simply didn’t occur to many that the broad goal of promoting good relationships merits intense attention.
It’s a bit harder to see how it’s tractable.