Up to now, discussions on longtermism have centred almost entirely on humans. In our chapter, we argue that this is a mistake.
Nonhuman animals already outnumber humans by orders of magnitude—billions of farmed terrestrial vertebrates, trillions of wild-caught fish, and even more wild animals (especially if we count invertebrates). More animals are killed by humans annually than the number of humans who have ever existed. If the long-term matters because of the sheer scale of future humans, then it matters at least as much, if not more, because of the even greater number of animals likely to exist. In addition to this, many of their lives contain a significant amount of suffering, both in agriculture and in the wild. Unless we assign implausibly low weight to animal welfare, their interests are likely to dominate the moral calculus in both short-termist and longtermist thinking. Even if not, they definitely need to be counted.
In light of this, we discuss a range of possible interventions that could improve the long-term future for animals. The first set of these are actions to change the number of animals (i.e. decrease the number of net-negative and increase the number of net-positive lives), such as ending factory farming, reducing some populations of wild animals and supporting the growth of others. Other actions are those aimed at improving the lives of those animals that do come into existence, including improving the conditions of animal agriculture, intervening to prevent suffering of wild animals, and use of technological or genetic interventions to enhance animal wellbeing.
We emphasise that probably the most important and effective interventions in the long term will be those that involve value change, as these will ensure that animals’ interests are persistently valued in institutions and policies. Many of the most impactful actions for animals involve shifting human attitudes and institutions toward lasting respect for animal welfare. If our current moment is one in which values risk becoming “locked in”—for example, through the design of AI systems—then ensuring animals are included is urgent.
The upshot is not that we already know which interventions are best. Rather, it’s that excluding animals from longtermist thought leaves out what may be the largest source of moral value (or disvalue) in the future. Bringing animals into the conversation will change how we think about what matters and how we evaluate possible interventions. We encourage anyone interested in longtermism and/or animal welfare to think about how animals should be included in longtermist thinking as this should be a key part of the research agenda.
Hi all,
Here’s a summary of the chapter written by me and Walter Veit, ‘Longtermism and Animals’.
Up to now, discussions on longtermism have centred almost entirely on humans. In our chapter, we argue that this is a mistake.
Nonhuman animals already outnumber humans by orders of magnitude—billions of farmed terrestrial vertebrates, trillions of wild-caught fish, and even more wild animals (especially if we count invertebrates). More animals are killed by humans annually than the number of humans who have ever existed. If the long-term matters because of the sheer scale of future humans, then it matters at least as much, if not more, because of the even greater number of animals likely to exist. In addition to this, many of their lives contain a significant amount of suffering, both in agriculture and in the wild. Unless we assign implausibly low weight to animal welfare, their interests are likely to dominate the moral calculus in both short-termist and longtermist thinking. Even if not, they definitely need to be counted.
In light of this, we discuss a range of possible interventions that could improve the long-term future for animals. The first set of these are actions to change the number of animals (i.e. decrease the number of net-negative and increase the number of net-positive lives), such as ending factory farming, reducing some populations of wild animals and supporting the growth of others. Other actions are those aimed at improving the lives of those animals that do come into existence, including improving the conditions of animal agriculture, intervening to prevent suffering of wild animals, and use of technological or genetic interventions to enhance animal wellbeing.
We emphasise that probably the most important and effective interventions in the long term will be those that involve value change, as these will ensure that animals’ interests are persistently valued in institutions and policies. Many of the most impactful actions for animals involve shifting human attitudes and institutions toward lasting respect for animal welfare. If our current moment is one in which values risk becoming “locked in”—for example, through the design of AI systems—then ensuring animals are included is urgent.
The upshot is not that we already know which interventions are best. Rather, it’s that excluding animals from longtermist thought leaves out what may be the largest source of moral value (or disvalue) in the future. Bringing animals into the conversation will change how we think about what matters and how we evaluate possible interventions. We encourage anyone interested in longtermism and/or animal welfare to think about how animals should be included in longtermist thinking as this should be a key part of the research agenda.