The person who would have been born if my parents had had sex five seconds later than they did when they conceived me—call him “Justin”—is not an actual person. He is a merely possible person. He does not actually exist any more than Sherlock Holmes actually exists. Of course, if my parents had had sex five seconds later, then he would be an actual person, and I would be the merely possible person. But they did not, so he is not an actual person. And accordingly my parents did not negatively affect any actual person by failing to conceive Justin, because Justin is not actual.
Similarly, if a nuclear war kills everyone, then there are no actual future people. They are merely possible people—just like all of the infinitely many possible people who would have existed in all the possible futures that wouldn’t have occurred anyway would have been merely possible people regardless of whether the war happened. None of them actually exist, just like Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist. Of course, if the nuclear war had not occurred, then they would be born and would be actual people. But it did happen, so they are not actual people. And accordingly the nuclear war does not negatively affect any actual future person, because the future people (given that, actually, there are no future people) are not actual.
I think what you want to say is that you can negatively affect people who, actually, are merely possible by preventing them from coming into existence, and for that reason you think “person-affecting view” is an inaccurate term. That’s a view you can take. But the crux is not whether future people are actual people (everyone agrees they are, if they actually exist at some point) and anyway this is not really the way to figure out what Parfit thought about longtermism.
Dustin Crummett
As far as I know, Parfit did coin it; he just didn’t mean “person-affecting views” to be “obviously biased” in favor of person-affecting views, since he rejected person-affecting views. The idea behind the term is not that “future people are somehow not actual people”: a proponent of a person-affecting view will generally agree that I have obligations to improve the welfare of someone who will exist in the future no matter what. (Maybe I can do something now to benefit, in the future, some kid who will be conceived on the other side of the world five minutes from now.) The idea is rather that people who aren’t actual (at any point, ever—as opposed to merely possible) are not actual people. In that event, the idea is that no person is negatively affected if they aren’t created, since there is no person to negatively affect.
So I understand: are you denying that the life with a tiny bit of positive welfare and no negative welfare, or the life with a tiny bit of positive welfare and a tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny bit of negative welfare, is determinately net positive? If so, I think that is an important crux. I don’t see why that would be.
I guess it had better not be a question of whether, as a matter of actual fact, I have the brainpower to do the exercise (with my eyes closed!). Babies, I assume, have no concept of their own non-existence, and so can’t compare any state they’re in to non-existence, yet they can have positive or negative welfare. Or someone who lives long enough will not be able to remember, much less bring to mind, everything that’s happened in their life, yet they can have a positive or negative welfare. So what matters is, if anything, some kind of idealized comparison I may or may not be able to do in actual fact. (And in any event, I guess the argument here would not be that nematodes have indeterminate welfare because their range is small, but rather that they do because they are stupid.)
What I’m suggesting could be the case is a situation where, say, the correct weighting of X vs Z is not a precise ratio but a range—anything between 7.9:1 and 8:1, let’s say for the sake of argument—such that the actual ratio falls into this indeterminate range, and a small change in either direction will not cause a departure from the range. I see how that could perhaps be the case. But that kind of indeterminacy is orthogonal to the size of the welfare range. It would still hold if the values were .087455668741 and .011024441253 or 87455668741 and 11024441253, and wouldn’t hold if the values were .087455668741 and .010024441253.
So my view is that if I have (X,Y,Z) at (0,0,0), which is equal to nonexistence, then (.01,0,0) is positive and (-.01,0,0) is negative. Why wouldn’t it be? Why wouldn’t a life with a slight positive and no negatives be positive? And presumably, say, (.01,0,-.00000001) will also be positive.
I think people frequently conflate there being no reason for something and there being very little reason. E.g., they’ll say “there is no evidence for a flat earth” when there is obviously some evidence for it (that some people believe in it is some evidence). If people say (.01,0,0) is not better than non-existence, I’d suspect that’s what they’re doing.
As far as I can see, there just isn’t such a thing as a neutral range. An individual could have an arbitrarily small welfare range and still have determinately positive or negative net welfare, or (I am open to the possibility of) an arbitrarily large welfare range while being such that it’s indeterminate whether their net welfare is positive or negative. And so noting that nematodes have small welfare ranges doesn’t tell us anything about this in and of itself.
I guess I’m not getting how this responds to my point. Suppose my welfare range (understood as representing the range of positive and negative experiences I can have) goes from -.01 to .01. I say I might have determinately positive welfare because, as a matter of fact, all, or the predominant majority of, my experiences are slightly positive. Otoh, suppose my range goes from −1000 to 1000. I say (I am open to the possibility that) it might be indeterminate whether I have positive welfare because I have a bunch of importantly different types of positive and negative experiences that are kind of closely matched without a uniquely correct weighting. So the indeterminacy is not related to the size of the welfare range but rather to having importantly different types of positive and negative experiences that are kind of closely matched without a uniquely correct weighting, or something like that. It could still be that it’s indeterminate whether nematodes have positive or negative welfare, but that won’t be just because their welfare range is small.
What’s your answer to that?
I don’t quite see the connection here between having a small welfare range and having an indeterminate welfare sign. Suppose a being is only capable of having very slightly positive experiences. Then it has a very small welfare range but it seems to me that its welfare range is determinately positive. It has positive and no negative experiences.
There is some plausibility to the idea that there may not be uniquely correct ways of weighing different experiences against each other. E.g., perhaps there is no uniquely correct answer to how many seconds of a pleasant breeze outweigh 60 minutes of a boring lecture, or how many minutes of the intellectual enjoyment of playing chess outweigh the sharp pain of a bad papercut, even if there are incorrect answers (maybe one second of the breeze is definitely not enough to outweigh the lecture). This may be plausible in light of the Ruth Chang-type intransitivity arguments: if I am indifferent between X seconds of the breeze and 60 minutes of the lecture, I might also be indifferent between X + 1 seconds of the breeze and 60 minutes of the lecture even though I obviously prefer X+1 seconds of the breeze to just X seconds, and it’s not clear that this is merely an epistemic issue. If, as came up in your discussion with Vasco, someone wants to understand one’s experience outweighing another’s as being a matter of what you would prefer (rather than a realist understanding on which the outweighing comes first and rational preferences will follow), this perhaps seems especially plausible, as I doubt our preferences about these things are, as a matter of descriptive psychology, always perfectly fine-grained.
in that case, I could see it being the case that it’s sometimes indeterminate whether a being has positive or negative welfare because it has lots of very different types of experiences which sort of come out closely matched with no uniquely correct weighting. But that is orthogonal to the size of the welfare range: that could turn out to be true even if the individual experiences are really (dis)valuable.
In many cases, it seems very doubtful whether further research into whether animals are conscious will be action-guiding in any meaningful way. Further research into whether chickens are conscious, say, will not produce definitive certainty that they are or aren’t. (Finding out whether your favorite theory of consciousness predicts that they are conscious is only so useful, as we should have significant uncertainty about the right theory of consciousness.) And moderate changes in your credence probably shouldn’t affect what you should do. E.g., if your credence in chicken consciousness drops 20%, there is still the moral risk argument for acting as if chickens are conscious; if you have some reason for rejecting that argument, that was probably also a reason when your credence was 20% higher. And at the same time, there are potentially very great opportunity costs to waiting to act—costs that don’t make sense if decision-relevant information isn’t actually likely to come in.
The EarlyModernTexts versions are what I read when I had to do my comprehensive history exam in grad school. I recommend them.
I accept the bullet biting response. I think someone who doesn’t should say the utility of the observers may outweigh Jones’ utility but that you should save Jones for some deontic reason (which is what Scanlon says), or maybe that many small bits of utility spread across people don’t sum in a straightforward way, and so can’t add up to outweigh Jones’ suffering (I think this is incorrect, but that something like it is probably what’s actually driving the intuition). I think the infinite disutility response is wrong, but that someone who accepts it should probably adopt some view in infinite ethics according to which two people suffering infinite disutility is worse than one—adopting some such view may be needed to avoid other problems anyway.
The solution you propose is interesting, but I don’t think I find it plausible:
1. If Jones’ disutility is finite, presumably there is some sufficiently large number of spectators, X, such that their aggregate utility would outweigh his disutility. Why think that, in fact, the physically possible number of observers is lower than X?
2. Suppose Jones isn’t suffering the worst torment possible, but merely “extremely painful” shocks, as in Scanlon’s example. So the number of observers needed to outweigh his suffering is not X, but the lower number Y. I suppose the intuitive answer is still that you should save him. But why think the physically possible number of observers is below Y?
3. Even if, in fact, the physically possible number of observers is lower than X, presumably the fundamental moral rules should work across possible worlds. And anyway, that seems to be baked into the thought experiment, as there is in fact no Galactic Cup. But even if the physically possible number of observers is in fact lower than X, it could be higher than X in another possible world.
4. Even if the possible number of observers is in fact finite, presumably there are possible worlds with an infinite number of possible observers (the laws of physics are very different, or time is infinite into the future, or there are disembodied ghosts watching, etc.). If we think the solution should work across possible worlds, the fact that there can only be a finite number of observers in our world is then irrelevant.
5. You assume our lightcone is finite “with certainty.” I assume this is because of the expected utility concern if there is some chance that it turns out not to be finite. But I think you shouldn’t have epistemic certainty that there can only be a finite number of observers.
6. The solution seems to get the intuitive answer for a counterintuitive reason. People find letting Jones get shocked in the transmitter case counterintuitive because they think there is something off about weighing one really bad harm against all these really small benefits, not because of anything having to do with whether there can only be a finite number of observers, and especially not because of anything having that could depend on the specific number of possible observers. Once we grant that the reason for the intuition is off, I’m not sure why we should trust the intuition itself.
*I think your answer to 1-3 may be that there is no set-in-stone number of observers needed to outweigh Jones’ suffering: we just pick some arbitrarily large amount and assign it to Jones, such that it’s higher than the total utility possessed by however many observers there might happen to be. I am a realist about utility in such a way that we can’t do this. But anyway, here is a potential argument against this:
Forget about what number we arbitrarily assign to represent Jones’ suffering. Two people each suffering very slightly less than Jones is worse than Jones’ suffering. Four people each suffering very slightly worse than them is worse than their suffering. Etc. If we keep going, we will reach some number of people undergoing some trivial amount of suffering which, intuitively, can be outweighed by enough people watching the Galactic Cup—call that number of observers Z. The suffering of those trivially suffering people is worse than the suffering of Jones, by transitivity. So the enjoyment of Z observers outweighs the suffering of Jones, by transitivity. And there is no reason to think the actual number of possible observers is smaller than Z.
Different ways of calculating impact make sense in different contexts. What I want to say is that the way Singer, MacAskill, GiveWell are doing it (i) is the one you should be using in deciding whether/where to donate (at the very least assuming you aren’t in some special collective action problem, etc.) and (ii) one that is totally fine by ordinary standards of speech—it isn’t deceptive, misleading, excessively imprecise, etc. Maybe we agree.
The criticism of the concept of “effective altruism,” and the second main criticism to the extent that it’s related to it, also feels odd to me. Altruism in the sense of only producing good is not realistically possible. By writing your Wired article, say, it is overwhelmingly likely that you set off a chain of events that will cause a different sperm to fertilize a different egg, which will set off all sorts of other chains of events meaning that in hundreds of years we will have different people, different weather patterns, different all sorts of stuff. So writing this will cause untold deaths, untold suffering, that wouldn’t have occurred otherwise. So too for your friend Aaron in the Wired article helping the people on the island, and so too for anything else you or anyone might do.
So either altruism is something other than doing only good, or altruism is impossible and the most we can hope for is some kind of approximation. It wouldn’t follow that maximizing EV is the best way to be (or approximate being) altruistic, but the mere fact that the actions EAs take are like all other actions in that they have some negative consequences is not in itself much of a criticism.
The first criticism feels pretty odd to me. Clearly what Singer, MacAskill, GiveWell, etc. are talking about is the counterfactual impact of your donation, since that is the thing that should be guiding your decision-making. And that seems totally fine and in accordance with ordinary English: it is fine to say that I saved the life of the choking person by performing the Heimlich maneuver, that Henry Heimlich saved X number of lives by inventing the Heimlich maneuver, that my instructor saved Y number of lives by teaching people the Heimlich maneuver, and that a government program to promote knowledge of the Heimlich maneuver saved Z lives, even if X + Y + Z + 1 is greater than the overall number of lives saved by the Heimlich maneuver. And if I were, say, arguing for increased funding of the government program by saying it would save a certain number of lives, it would be completely beside the point to start arguing that I should actually divide the marginal impact of increased funding to account for the contribution of Henry Heimlich, etc.
Hi! There are no specific formal education requirements, though relevant qualifications are desirable, as mentioned in the “preferred” section.
Yes! It depends on the specifics, but we can hire in most European countries, and (if needed) in some cases can try to help with relocation, etc.
The Insect Institute is hiring for a vital, exciting, foundational role: a full-time Program Coordinator or Program Officer (depending on the qualifications of the successful candidate). This is a high-responsibility position where you will have the opportunity to drive real impact for our mission. As our second full-time employee, you will be tasked with helping to carry out the Insect Institute’s interventions, including through engagement with policymakers, regulators, NGOs, and potentially media. Suitably qualified candidates may also be asked to contribute to research and report writing. As one of only a few people worldwide working in an extremely important cause area, you will have the potential for enormous counterfactual impact.
Salary: $73,630-$87,694 USD pre-tax
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Application Deadline: April 1st, end of day in the EST time zone
The full job description and application is available here. If you know someone else who might be a good fit, a referral form is available here. We offer a $500 bonus for referring the successful candidate. Questions about the role can be directed to info@insectinstitute.org.
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Key ResponsibilitiesImplementing the Insect Institute’s interventions. This might include, but not necessarily be limited to, activities like:
Working with legislators on, e.g., environmental issues related to the adoption of insects as food and feed
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Especially for more senior levels, taking initiative to, e.g., identify ways to improve on current interventions, or to identify opportunities for new interventions
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We do not require starting familiarity with relevant academic domains (e.g., environmental science, public health, animal welfare, entomology) or with the state of the insects as food and feed industry. However, the candidate should possess the ability to gain familiarity as needed, and to proactively stay abreast of developments
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If you do not meet all of the below criteria, please still consider applying. Please also take an expansive interpretation of the below criteria (e.g., if you are not sure whether your work experience is relevant, err on the side of assuming it might be).
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Outreach to legislators or relevant government agencies (such as the USDA or FDA in the US, or Defra or the FSA in the UK), especially if on relevant issues (environment sustainability, food safety, etc.)
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Work in an NGO, such as one focused on the environment, alternative proteins, food safety, or animal welfare, doing work similar to that mentioned in the “key responsibilities” above
Experience managing others, especially in working on relevant issues
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They are separate views, but related: people with person-affecting views usually endorse the asymmetry, people without person-affecting views usually don’t endorse the asymmetry, and person-affecting views are often taken to (somehow or other) provide a kind of justification for the asymmetry. The upshot here is that it wouldn’t be enough for people at OP to endorse person-affecting views: they’d have to endorse a version of a person-affecting view that is rejected even by most people with person-affecting views, and that independently seems gonzo—one according to which, say, I have no reason at all not to push a button that creates a trillion people who are gratuitously tortured in hell forever.
Very roughly, how this works: person-affecting views say that a situation can’t be better or worse than another unless it benefits or harms someone. (Note that the usual assumption here is that, to be harmed or benefited, the individual doesn’t have to exist now, but they have to exist at some point.) This is completely compatible with thinking it’s worse to create the trillion people who suffer forever: it might be that their existing is worse for them than not existing, or harms them in some non-comparative way. So it can be worse to create them, since it’s worse for them. And that should also be enough to get the view that, e.g., you shouldn’t create animals with awful lives on factory farms.
Of course, usually people with person-affecting views want it to be neutral to create happy people, and then there is a problem about how to maintain that while accepting the above view about not creating people in hell. So somehow or other they’ll need to justify the asymmetry. One way to try this might be via the kind of asymmetrical complaint-based model I mentioned above: if you create the people in hell, there are actual individuals you harm (the people in hell), but if you don’t create people in heaven, there is no actual individual you fail to benefit (since the potential beneficiaries never exist). In this way, you might try to fit the views together. Then you would have the view that it’s neutral to ensure the awesome existence of future people who populate the cosmos, but still important to avoid creating animals with net-negative lives, or future people who get tortured by AM or whatever.
Now, it is true that people with person-affecting views could instead say that there is nothing good or bad about creating individuals either way—maybe because they think there’s just no way to compare existence and non-existence, and they think this means there’s no way to say that causing someone to exist benefits or harms them. But this is a fringe view, because, e.g., it leads to gonzo conclusions like thinking there’s no reason not to push the hell button.
I think all this is basically in line with how these views are understood in the academic literature, cf., e.g., here.
Generally, people with person-affecting views still want it to be the case that we shouldn’t create individuals with awful lives, and probably also that we should prefer the creation of someone with a life that is net-negative by less over someone with a life that is net-negative by more. (This relates to the supposed procreation asymmetry, where, allegedly, that a kid would be really happy is not a reason to have them, but that a kid would be in constant agony is a reason not to have them.) One way to justify this would be the thought that, if you don’t create a happy person, no one has a complaint, but if you do create a miserable person, someone does have a complaint (i.e., that person).
Where factory-farmed animals have net-negative lives, I’m not sure person-affecting views would justify neglecting animal welfare, then. (Similarly, re: longtermism, they might justify neglecting long-term x-risks, but not s-risks.)
Hi Ula!
As I just wrote to Forumite above: very happy to discuss (with you or anyone else reading) via email, DM—or better yet, call (https://calendly.com/dustin-crummett), or, if you’ll be at EAG Bay Area, EAGx Nordics, or EAG London, or happen to be near Seattle, in person.
I think your stridency outpaces your understanding of the issue in such a way that continuing the conversation is not likely to be useful. So I will stop after this.
Your original claim was that Parfit “thinks future people are somehow not actual people.” That is wrong. What he thinks is that people who are not actual (=do not, at any point, exist in the actual world) are not actually people. (Justin is not a human being. Human beings, among other things, have DNA, and Justin does not (actually) have any DNA. Justin only possibly has DNA and is only possibly a human being. So, too, Justin is not a person—he is only possibly a person. Anyway, that is the dominant way of thinking about this in analytic philosophy.) So, on this way of thinking, person-affecting views do not restrict themselves to an arbitrary subset of people, because merely possible people are not people. You take issue with this, which some people do, though you do not seem aware of the metaphysical issues your view raises, and anyway it doesn’t seem true to me that your view is obvious. Parfit’s takeaway from all this, very roughly, is that sometimes you have an obligation to make the world better even though failing to do so would not harm any particular person, whereas you want to say that in those cases the obligation is because failing to do so would harm merely possible people. I think these views will wind up being equivalent in their practical recommendations.
You also want to say that calling them “person-affecting views” is “a pretty strong mark against counting Parfit as a godfather of longtermism.” To me, the way to determine whether he is a godfather of longtermism is to ask whether he was a primary originator and defender of the ideas underpinning longtermism, not to look at what he named a different view.