Hi so two remarks:
I would say that talking about a fraction here is too akward. Like awkward enough that I think it would be better to avoid it.
Given this, let me outline a ITN inspired model:
Cost-Effectiveness = Importance x Cost-Efficiency
or
B = I * CE
where:
B (for benefit) = moral goodness achieved per resource
I = moral goodness of helping an extra being
CE = extra beings helped per resource
With some EA-style ethical assumptions this model becomes informative/true.
Then your post can be summarized as EAs focusing too much on having a reasonable estimate of CE, while making half-arsed assumptions about “I”. I wholeheartedly agree with this criticism. I think we should normalize and standardize focusing a lot more of our effort on carefully assessing “I”, just like we have with CE. And I like that you have outlined just how many considerations go into “I”. It can include indirect effects, like the meat eater problem, but also moral considerations. Importantly, it should also take into account moral uncertaintiy (not doing so is epistemic hubris). So a full analysis of an intervention/cause area would be:
cost-efficiency analysis → indirect effect analysis → moral analyisis → profit!
and in the moral analyisis you have to jointly determine:
a) Which normative theories you give creedence to
b) How you’ll deal with moral uncertainty
c) The specific numeric assumptions you’ll rely on (like welfare weights for example).
Or at least this is what my brain tells me should happen. I have been thinking about this a lot and there is a very nasty tradeoff between making a model more likely to be true and making said model more likely to guide action. There are just too many unknowns. Even then, I think we could profit from adapting this structure for reporting our estimates. In short, if somebody’s case for an intervention’s cost-effectiveness looks like this:
Cost-efficiency:
CE = a gazillion chickens saved from torture per dollar
determined by an RCT
Indirect effects = 0
I made it up
Moral analysis:
A) Normative Theories = Utilitarianism
B) Strategy against moral uncertainty = none lmao
C) Specific assumptions = chickens have a moral weight of exactly 2 because I feel like it
then, even if we agree that their strategy is lacklustre, their assumptions are transparent and it’s easier to criticize. And showing off all of the steps that were skipped could incentivize people to skip these steps less (or get serious about defending why they can be skipped). I’ve been thinking about writing a post about this in the future (I have a post on the formal ITN model coming soon. As I am thinking about writing another one about making new models, I struggle to come up with something that is both rigorous and usable)
You seem to think ignoring “I” (“the denominator”) drives us to expand our moral circle too much. That might be true, but the effect might be smaller than you think. If we start taking “the denominator” more seriously, maybe the biggest change won’t be the moral patients we care about, but rather which interventions we deem more effective at helping them
Hi so I’m definitely one of the people that is in the Lizardmans constant in this case [edit:I just read actually I’m not, only the first attempt counts]. I first took the test honestly and got totalism (as I already expected). But then, since the test allowed it, I took the liberty of retaking it. This time less honestly. I was mostly curious how the website would react to not intended answers. Among the thins I tried are: averagism, the opposite of totalism, the opposite of averagism, maximizing the number of lives (natalism), responding at random and trying to get as many inconsistencies and bitten bullets as possible. I was pleasantly surprised you did not label consistent but absurd views as inconsistent and liked the quiz a quite a bit (if you can tell). I hope you don’t mind me contaminating the data a bit.