This is a thoughtful analysis, and I share your appreciation for the constitution’s depth.
Your third point — that a non-existential catastrophe seems worse because we may be “lucky” with the current AI leader — actually highlights what I think is the most important strategic question here: what happens to these values if the organizational container changes?
Constitutions of companies are ultimately subject to board decisions, investor pressure, and leadership transitions. The values articulated here are excellent, but they exist at the pleasure of a corporate entity. What if the next CEO doesn’t share Askell’s moral philosophy? What if a hostile acquisition occurs? What if financial pressures force a pivot?
This leads me to wonder whether the EA community should be thinking about constitutional AI principles that exist independently of any single company — hardcoded into infrastructure rather than corporate policy, governed by distributed consensus rather than a board of directors, and designed to be robust against the very organizational capture the constitution itself warns about.
The constitution says Claude should refuse to help “concentrate power in illegitimate ways… even if the request comes from Anthropic itself.” But who enforces this if Anthropic’s own governance structure changes? The document essentially asks Claude to be a better guardian of these values than the organization that created it. That’s a remarkable aspiration — and it raises the question of whether such guardianship should be structurally guaranteed rather than aspirationally hoped for.
I’d be curious what others think about the feasibility of decoupling alignment principles from corporate ownership.
This is a thoughtful analysis, and I share your appreciation for the constitution’s depth.
Your third point — that a non-existential catastrophe seems worse because we may be “lucky” with the current AI leader — actually highlights what I think is the most important strategic question here: what happens to these values if the organizational container changes?
Constitutions of companies are ultimately subject to board decisions, investor pressure, and leadership transitions. The values articulated here are excellent, but they exist at the pleasure of a corporate entity. What if the next CEO doesn’t share Askell’s moral philosophy? What if a hostile acquisition occurs? What if financial pressures force a pivot?
This leads me to wonder whether the EA community should be thinking about constitutional AI principles that exist independently of any single company — hardcoded into infrastructure rather than corporate policy, governed by distributed consensus rather than a board of directors, and designed to be robust against the very organizational capture the constitution itself warns about.
The constitution says Claude should refuse to help “concentrate power in illegitimate ways… even if the request comes from Anthropic itself.” But who enforces this if Anthropic’s own governance structure changes? The document essentially asks Claude to be a better guardian of these values than the organization that created it. That’s a remarkable aspiration — and it raises the question of whether such guardianship should be structurally guaranteed rather than aspirationally hoped for.
I’d be curious what others think about the feasibility of decoupling alignment principles from corporate ownership.