I agree that there’s an interesting tension between potentially greater value from “saving”/capacity-building due to increased info and productivity over time, and potentially greater value from spending sooner on targeted interventions/opportunities that may not be available later. It seems to me that deep uncertainty about how to use such opportunities, and what exactly those opportunities are, tentatively favors efforts to improve our estimates and build flexible resources (so that we have a better chance of making a beneficial use of our opportunities; outsized opportunities don’t seem that valuable without a decent sense of how to use them).
Also, contrary to the opposing framing, it could in principle be that the greatest and most time-sensitive opportunity we now have is a form of capacity-building. For example, we might now have openings for high-impact capacity-building that won’t be available later.
Thank you. I agree that it seems very plausible that the consequences of any capacity-building strategy will include large off-target effects, and I agree that any such strategy will in a sense be highly non-robust. So in those respects I don’t think otherwise. But I don’t think any of that implies that one option can’t still be meaningfully better than another in expectation, or have a higher degree of ex ante betterness. The latter seems a much weaker standard.
This seems to require something like the following premise:
“strategy A’s impact is very plausibly dominated by off-target effects that we can only estimate very coarsely” ⇒ “we cannot make any justified comparative verdicts about the c-betterness of strategy A compared to any other strategy”
That seems like a big leap to me, and I don’t see how it follows or what justifies it. Perhaps that step is defensible under maximality. (Although even there it doesn’t seem obvious: a strategy could in principle be maximality-preferred even if its impact is very plausibly dominated by off-target effects, provided that it still has higher EV than the alternative across all admissible probability functions.) But under a graded approach, or other more discerning approaches, I don’t see why large and highly uncertain off-target effects should preclude any meaningful comparative judgments, rather than simply weaken the degree of justification for them.