Wladimir J. Alonso

• Wladimir J. Alonso 11 Feb 2026 13:40 UTC

  3 points

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  in reply to: Jim Buhler’s comment on: Why Neu­ron Counts Shouldn’t Be Used as Prox­ies for Mo­ral Weight

  Good catch, Jim — and thanks for flagging the terminology. This field is already complicated enough that we really don’t need parallel vocabularies for the same underlying idea. One of the reasons we post publicly is exactly to get this kind of “conceptual linting” from the community.

  I think Birch et al.’s acuity is basically what we mean by resolution: sensitivity to small differences — the ability to discriminate fine gradations (what psychophysics would call “just-noticeable differences”). Where we’re being careful is in separating that from range, which refers to the maximum intensity an organism can plausibly access.

  So in short: acuity ≈ resolution in our usage; it’s distinct from range.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 10 Feb 2026 18:26 UTC

  1 point

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  in reply to: Jim Buhler’s comment on: Why Neu­ron Counts Shouldn’t Be Used as Prox­ies for Mo­ral Weight

  Thanks, Jim — that’s a thoughtful attempt to restate our terms, and it touches on something important you asked in the other thread about bandwidth–acuity vs range–resolution.

  Our range concept maps fairly closely onto the welfare range used in Rethink Priorities’ Moral Weight project — it refers to the upper bound of affective intensity an organism can plausibly access .

  Where we’d adjust is resolution. In the earlier draft your summary makes it sound like resolution is just “precision within a bounded range,” but that framing risks suggesting that resolution is always subordinate to range in motivational function. In fact, from a pure information-encoding perspective, resolution is as versatile as range for enabling intensity-based prioritization, because in principle both could be increased indefinitely: range by extending the extreme ends of the scale, and resolution by subdividing any given range into arbitrarily fine gradations. We develop this point in the The Function and Evolution of Affective Scales section of the Do primitive sentient organisms feel extreme pain? paper

  So the distinction isn’t “range = strength, resolution = detail”; it’s that range and resolution are two orthogonal axes along which affective systems can vary, each capable of supporting graded prioritization. A system with high resolution but modest range could still distinguish and act on nuanced motivational differences without accessing extreme affective intensities at all.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 9 Feb 2026 13:23 UTC

  1 point

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  in reply to: Jim Buhler’s comment on: When Feel­ing Is Worth It: A Cost–Benefit Frame­work for the Evolu­tion of Sentience

  Thanks Jim
  
  On the cost point you raised — “extra integration, valuation, and modulatory capacity are costly only if they decrease fitness in some way, right?” — selection indeed acts on net fitness. Still, it’s both useful and standard to keep costs and benefits analytically separate before recombining them. A trait can be costly in terms of resources or architecture even when it increases fitness overall; brains and immune systems are classic examples.

  On your footnote #3 — “the question of whether organisms with narrower welfare ranges could feel extreme pain” — I think there may be a bit of a contradiction in terms. If an organism has a genuinely narrower welfare range, then by definition (or at least under the operational definitions I’m using), it does not reach disabling or excruciating levels of negative affect. In that framing, the relevant question is precisely where the negative-intensity ceiling lies.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 9 Feb 2026 0:37 UTC

  1 point

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  in reply to: Jim Buhler’s comment on: When Feel­ing Is Worth It: A Cost–Benefit Frame­work for the Evolu­tion of Sentience

  Thanks, Jim — that does get to the crux.

  I think your scenario is plausible in principle: once an alarm is “loud enough,” further increases in intensity could be selectively neutral, so unnecessarily loud alarms might persist by drift, much like neutral variants in molecular evolution.

  My hesitation is about how often extreme felt intensity actually falls into that neutral regime. For neutrality to hold, extra intensity must add no benefit and impose no additional costs or constraints. If affective states are whole-organism control states rather than simple sensory readouts, then escalating intensity plausibly requires extra integration, valuation, or modulatory capacity. In that case, intensity beyond “loud enough” would not be strictly neutral, and drift would be limited.

  So I see neutral drift as a live alternative, but not the default. The framework is meant to clarify when neutrality is plausible versus when selection should instead cap, reshape, or avoid extreme intensity altogether.
  

• Wladimir J. Alonso 8 Feb 2026 23:55 UTC

  3 points

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  in reply to: Vasco Grilo🔸’s comment on: When Feel­ing Is Worth It: A Cost–Benefit Frame­work for the Evolu­tion of Sentience

  Thanks, Vasco — I really appreciate that.

  Yes, some dedicated funding would be very welcome to help expand and accelerate the comparative analysis of affective capacity. I have a few ideas I’d be keen to discuss once the follow-up piece is out and the framework is more fully specified.

  Let’s definitely stay in touch — I’ll make sure to loop back..

• Wladimir J. Alonso 8 Feb 2026 23:38 UTC

  1 point

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  in reply to: Itamar Menuhin-Gruman’s comment on: When Feel­ing Is Worth It: A Cost–Benefit Frame­work for the Evolu­tion of Sentience

  Thanks, Itamar. I’m glad you found the framework useful, and thanks for laying out these concerns.

  (1) On selection in life-or-death situations.
  I’m less convinced that life-or-death contexts should be treated as marginal for evolutionary explanation. Many such hazards (e.g. fire, severe injury, predation) recur across generations, and even small increases in the probability of rapid withdrawal and survival can be strongly selected for. In that sense, excruciating pain in these contexts looks like a straightforward case of ordinary evolutionary logic at work, rather than a special case where costs become irrelevant or selection effectively “switches off.”

  (2) On alternative mechanisms (linear transduction, hormones, etc.).
  I’m very sympathetic to the idea of carefully considering non-adaptive explanations, since some features can indeed arise as byproducts of other selective pressures. I was an avid reader of Stephen Jay Gould, and The Spandrels of San Marco remains a classic reminder of this point. So I agree that high-intensity pain could arise largely as a byproduct of how damage signals scale at the sensory or cellular level, rather than because intensity itself was directly selected for. At the same time, this kind of “linear transduction” may itself carry adaptive value (i.e. function as an exaptation, again in Gould’s sense), since greater damage would naturally call for more urgent behavioral responses to stop it.

  On the point about hormones or other system-wide mechanisms, I may be missing what you have in mind — I’d be very interested in a concrete example and in how you think it would change the cost–benefit picture.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 6 Feb 2026 20:29 UTC

  3 points

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  in reply to: Vasco Grilo🔸’s comment on: When Feel­ing Is Worth It: A Cost–Benefit Frame­work for the Evolu­tion of Sentience

  Thanks a lot, Vasco — and thanks for the upvote!

  You’re absolutely right to push us toward the practical question of how to compare affective capacity across species. That’s ultimately where this line of work needs to go. At the same time, we’ve been deliberately cautious here, because we think this is one of those cases where moving too quickly to numbers or rankings risks making the waters muddier rather than clearer.

  Our sense is that the comparison of affective capacity across species hinges on a set of upstream scientific questions that are still poorly articulated- especially around when sentience arises at all, and when it plausibly extends to very intense affective states. The aim of this piece was to stress-test a way of structuring those questions before turning them into quantitative tools.

  That said, we do see this as complementary to RP’s research agenda on valuing impacts across species. In fact, we think cost–benefit reasoning about sentience and affective intensity can help discipline some of the assumptions that go into moral-weight or welfare-capacity estimates, rather than replacing them.

  We’re currently working on a follow-up that moves closer to a practical comparative framework, and we’re very much treating the present work as groundwork for that. Happy to loop back and share it once it’s ready — and we’d be keen to hear your thoughts then as well.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 6 Feb 2026 20:06 UTC

  3 points

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  in reply to: Jim Buhler’s comment on: When Feel­ing Is Worth It: A Cost–Benefit Frame­work for the Evolu­tion of Sentience

  Thanks a lot for the kind words, Jim — and for the thoughtful pushback.

  I think your point holds if we assume that the only way to implement a very strong alarm is via extreme felt intensity — but that assumption is exactly what we’re questioning.

  I agree that in genuinely catastrophic situations, evolution should tolerate very “loud” alarms. The open question, though, is whether those alarms need to be implemented as extreme affective states, rather than through non-affective or lower-intensity control mechanisms.

  On the benefit side, there seem to be two distinct roles a very strong signal could play. First, triggering an immediate reaction in life-or-death situations. But this doesn’t require affect at all: many organisms (including very simple ones) already show robust threat responses via non-felt control. Even in sentient organisms, immediate escape could in principle be driven by low-intensity affect if thresholds are set low enough, especially where behavioral options are limited.

  Second, overriding other ongoing motivations in organisms with richer behavioral repertoires. Here, stronger affective signals become more plausibly useful, as they can reliably dominate competing drives (foraging, mating, self-maintenance, etc.). One way to achieve this is by expanding affective range rather than relying only on finer discrimination within a narrow range.

  On the cost side, generating and sustaining very high-intensity affective states may plausibly require substantial architectural capacity of the kind we discuss above. In systems with limited computational or neural resources—and especially in organisms with few available behavioral options—extreme felt states may therefore be difficult or unnecessary to implement, regardless of how valuable a very loud alarm would be.

When Feel­ing Is Worth It: A Cost–Benefit Frame­work for the Evolu­tion of Sentience

• Wladimir J. Alonso 28 Dec 2025 1:32 UTC

  1 point

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  in reply to: Becca Rogers’s comment on: Test­ing an Idea: A Pro­to­type for Guid­ing Welfare-Con­scious Food Decisions

  Thanks, Becca — really glad you took a look and liked it.

  On your point about how this relates to certifications and similar tools: we see this as strongly complementary to them, not an alternative. When Welfare Footprint estimates become available, our hope is that they’ll be usable in many different ways by different stakeholders — including certification initiatives themselves — rather than being tied to a single interface or application.

  This app is best understood as an early exploratory step: a way of seeing how people actually engage with welfare information, what resonates or causes confusion, and how different framings influence choices. We hope these insights can be useful not just for us, but for anyone thinking about how WFF-style estimates might be effectively deployed beyond a single app.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 28 Dec 2025 0:59 UTC

  3 points

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  in reply to: Vasco Grilo🔸’s comment on: Do prim­i­tive sen­tient or­ganisms feel ex­treme pain? dis­en­tan­gling in­ten­sity range and re­s­olu­tion

  Thanks for spelling this out, Vasco — yes, that’s a fair clarification.

  When we say that pain intensities are defined as “absolute” in WFF, this is meant in a conceptual and operational sense within a shared intensity vocabulary, not as a claim that no interspecific adjustments are needed in practice. The statement you quote is explicitly conditional (“if shrimps were capable of experiencing Excruciating pain”) and is held as a temporary, simplifying assumption to allow measurement of time spent in different intensity categories, while recognizing that the true placement of experiences on an absolute scale across taxa remains an open scientific problem.
  

  At a personal scientific level, I find it very implausible that the affective capacity of a shrimp and that of a human are comparable. However, because this remains an unresolved empirical question, the framework itself is intentionally agnostic and requires that any interspecific adjustments be made explicitly and post-quantification, rather than being implicitly embedded in the core estimates.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 26 Dec 2025 12:18 UTC

  3 points

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  in reply to: Vasco Grilo🔸’s comment on: Do prim­i­tive sen­tient or­ganisms feel ex­treme pain? dis­en­tan­gling in­ten­sity range and re­s­olu­tion

  Thanks, Vasco. We recognize that for most specific interspecies comparisons, affective capacity (not probability of sentience) is indeed crucial, but this remains an open scientific question. For that reason, the Welfare Footprint Framework is intentionally agnostic about correction values for interspecific scaling: welfare estimates are produced without such corrections, and any assumptions about differences in affective capacity must be applied explicitly and transparently as optional post-quantification adjustments when particular comparisons require them, rather than being implicitly folded into the core estimates.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 23 Dec 2025 18:22 UTC

  5 points

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  in reply to: Vasco Grilo🔸’s comment on: Do prim­i­tive sen­tient or­ganisms feel ex­treme pain? dis­en­tan­gling in­ten­sity range and re­s­olu­tion

  Hi Vasco,
  
  In the Welfare Footprint Framework, pain and pleasure intensities are defined as absolute categories conditional on an experience being affective, and uncertainty about sentience is treated upstream as a separate epistemic issue rather than folded into intensity probabilities. The closest point of contact between these questions is affective capacity—since different organisms may plausibly reach different intensity ranges or resolutions, as discussed in our article—but probability of sentience is not part of the equation, because the definition of sentience we adopt is itself conditioned on the capacity to experience affective states.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 23 Dec 2025 15:19 UTC

  1 point

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  on: Ex­plo­ra­tion of ca­pa­bil­ity build­ing within the EA ecosys­tem through use of AI

  Hi Itamar — congratulations on all these initiatives.

  As promised in our private exchange, I wanted to lay out an architectural idea I’ve been exploring for LLM-based applications, which may be useful to others building similar tools. I don’t know how novel this is, but in a world where many tools will increasingly rely on AI, I think it’s a good general practice.

  The core idea is simple: all AI prompts live in a dedicated, human-readable folder, separate from application logic.

  There are two main reasons for this.

  First, radical transparency. If an application makes claims, recommendations, or interpretations that matter ethically or scientifically, then the instructions guiding the AI are part of what should be open to scrutiny. Keeping prompts in a clearly accessible place makes the system legible not only to developers, but also to researchers, ethicists, and communities like EA or academia who may want to understand how conclusions are being generated, not just what the interface shows.

  Second, a clean separation between scientific or ethical content and engineering plumbing. Prompts often reflect underlying assumptions, value choices, and ways of thinking about a problem. Keeping them visible and separate from the rest of the code helps ensure that changes to how the AI reasons or frames an issue are intentional and easy to review, rather than happening quietly as a side effect of technical work. In practice, this folder is meant to be the main reference for what the AI is told to do, while the surrounding code simply handles running it.

  In our Welfare Food Explorer app, for example, this structure allows researchers and non-developers to easily find, read, and reason about what the AI is being instructed to do, without needing to navigate the rest of the codebase.

  We adopted this approach because in applications that touch science, ethics, welfare, or normative interpretation, how the AI reasons is part of the substance of the system itself. Making prompts visible, inspectable, and discussable helps treat AI behavior as something that can be examined, debated, and improved by a broader audience.

  I hope this perspective is useful to others. Cheers.

Test­ing an Idea: A Pro­to­type for Guid­ing Welfare-Con­scious Food Decisions

• Wladimir J. Alonso 26 Nov 2025 12:05 UTC

  1 point

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  in reply to: Itamar Menuhin-Gruman’s comment on: State of LLM-pow­ered pri­ori­ti­za­tion research

  Hi Itamar That sounds great — I’d be happy to connect

• Wladimir J. Alonso 24 Nov 2025 19:07 UTC

  5 points

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  in reply to: EdoArad’s comment on: State of LLM-pow­ered pri­ori­ti­za­tion research

  Thanks for the kind words! I am glad you found the tool useful.

  A quick update: we’ve now expanded the system so it doesn’t just quantify negative affective experiences, but also positive ones. Because of this broader scope, the new version is called Hedonic-Track GPT, and it is gradually replacing the earlier Pain-Track GPT.

  We may need to update this article soon so readers are directed to the most current tool. In the meantime, you can find the link to the Hedonic-Track GPT here:

  https://​​chatgpt.com/​​g/​​g-cpXxeWtgg-hedonic-track

• Wladimir J. Alonso 28 Oct 2025 21:06 UTC

  18 points

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  on: Is “cage free” re­ally the most hu­mane op­tion for egg-lay­ing hens?

  Thank you very much for this thorough analysis and for the constructive comments.
  Cynthia will address the points related to the results of the study, while I’ll focus here on the methodological aspects.

  One of the most important points you raise touches on the core of the Welfare Footprint Framework itself: we recognize that inferring the affective states of other beings is enormously challenging—both in scope and depth. This task can never be complete; it will always require revisions and corrections as new evidence becomes available. The Welfare Footprint Framework is, in essence, an attempt to structure this challenge into as many workable, auditable pieces as possible, so that the process of inference can be progressively improved and openly scrutinized.

  You are absolutely right that several painful conditions in chickens were not included in this initial analysis. This was a conscious decision—not because those harms are unimportant, but because we had to start with a subset that we judged to be among the most influential and best documented. The framework is designed precisely so that others can build upon it by incorporating additional conditions, refining prevalence estimates, or reassessing intensities. In that sense, this work should be seen as a living model, not a closed dataset.

  Regarding the concern about the lack of use of high-quality statistical techniques, our approach is pragmatic. Where robust statistical analyses are feasible—such as in estimating prevalence or duration—they are of course welcome and encouraged. But in areas where measurement is currently impossible—most notably the intensity of affective states—we deliberately avoid mathematical sophistication for its own sake. No amount of elegant equations can compensate for the fact that subjective experience is, for now, beyond direct measurement. What we can do is gather convergent evidence from different sources—e.g. behavior, physiology, neurology, evolutionary reasoning—and generalize that evidence into transparent, revisable estimates, and make every assumption explicit so that others can challenge and adjust them.

  As for the legitimacy of this approach, we believe that, while imperfect and always improvable, quantifying affective experiences is vastly more informative than relying solely on indirect indicators such as mortality. Animals can live long, physically healthy lives that are nevertheless filled with frustration, chronic pain, fear, or monotony—forms of suffering invisible to metrics that focus only on death or disease. By directing efforts toward gathering as much evidence as possible to infer the intensity and duration of each stage spent in negative and positive affective states, we can begin to capture what actually matters to the animal.

  The framework has also evolved since this analysis was first produced. At that time, we focused primarily on negative affective states, but we have now extended the methodology to include Cumulative Pleasure alongside Cumulative Pain. Positive affective states are now being systematically quantified using the same operational principles, creating a fuller picture of animal welfare.

  Finally, we are developing an open, collaborative platform where Pain-Tracks and Pleasure-Tracks can be published, discussed, and iteratively improved by the broader scientific community. Each component of a track—for example, the probability assigned to a certain intensity within a phase of an affective experience—could be challenged and refined, potentially even through expert voting or consensus mechanisms. The aim is to make welfare quantification transparent, dynamic, and collective rather than proprietary.

  Thanks again for putting our work under the microscope—this is exactly what it needs. The Framework is meant to evolve, and feedback like yours helps it grow in the right direction.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 5 Sep 2025 15:02 UTC

  3 points

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  in reply to: Vasco Grilo🔸’s comment on: Sav­ing hu­man lives cheaply is the most cost-effec­tive way of in­creas­ing an­i­mal welfare?

  Thanks Vasco. I’d like to clarify that Disabling Pain is also a severe/​intensive level—think of it as the kind of crippling back pain or intense headache that prevents any enjoyment or productivity. And our project study found that moving a hen from a furnished cage to a cage-free aviary prevents, on average, hundreds of hours of Disabling Pain during her laying life. Specifically, transitioning to cage-free systems avoids approximately 275 hours of Disabling pain ( https://​​welfarefootprint.org/​​laying-hens).
  
  Additionally, as argued in the book, the estimates for Excruciating Pain were extremely conservative (i.e. Cumulative Pain in both cage systems is likely higher than estimated). We’ll have full estimates soon, once ‘The Welfare Footprint of the Egg’ is released.

• Wladimir J. Alonso 25 Aug 2025 12:54 UTC

  7 points

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  in reply to: Vasco Grilo🔸’s comment on: Sav­ing hu­man lives cheaply is the most cost-effec­tive way of in­creas­ing an­i­mal welfare?

  Thanks, Vasco. I think we’ve clarified where our frameworks diverge—you prioritize maximizing expected welfare, assuming that equivalences across intensities are possible once the time component is introduced (an assumption I don’t share), whereas I tend to emphasize minimizing the most intense forms of suffering. Both approaches have their merits, but they naturally lead to different prioritizations. Perhaps we can just agree to disagree on this point.

  What links here?

  • Vasco Grilo🔸's comment on In­con­sis­tent Anthropocentrism by Richard Y Chappell🔸 (13 Oct 2025 9:08 UTC; 4 points)