Thanks for the feedback. We do think there is a compelling case for saving expected lives in the present generation cost effectively. On the long-term future, we do not have a quantitative model for how important extinction versus unrecoverable collapse versus negative trajectory changes are in these scenarios (and in terms of mitigation from interventions). So I would say it is closest to:
reducing numbers of deaths and global instability is just a good proxy for reducing existential risk
In this way, our situation seems analogous to the situation of someone who is caring for a sapling, has very limited experience with saplings, has no mechanistic understanding of how saplings work, and wants to ensure that nothing stops the sapling from becoming a great redwood. It would be hard for them to be confident that the sapling’s eventual long-term growth would be unaffected by unprecedented shocks—such as cutting off 40% of its branches or letting it go without water for 20% longer than it ever had before—even taken as given that such shocks wouldn’t directly/immediately result in its death. For similar reasons, it seems hard to be confident that humanity’s eventual long-term progress would be unaffected by a catastrophe that resulted in hundreds of millions of deaths.
Thanks for the feedback. We do think there is a compelling case for saving expected lives in the present generation cost effectively. On the long-term future, we do not have a quantitative model for how important extinction versus unrecoverable collapse versus negative trajectory changes are in these scenarios (and in terms of mitigation from interventions). So I would say it is closest to:
As Nick Beckstead said: