I think it’s worthwhile distinguishing between the demandingness objection as an argument against insect/worm/mite/nematodes’ interests mattering, and as an argument against them being sentient. I think you can make the first case but not the second.
There’s a distinction in theory but in practice the vague definition of “sentience” is so tied to moral relevance I don’t think you can argue for one without also arguing for the other.
The question “does a worm feel pain” isn’t really asking “does the worm have nociceptors and some degree of integration of those nociceptive signals that causes learning and behavioural changes”. It’s really asking, at the core, “does a worm ‘feel pain’ in a way that’s morally important”
I think it’s worthwhile distinguishing between the demandingness objection as an argument against insect/worm/mite/nematodes’ interests mattering, and as an argument against them being sentient. I think you can make the first case but not the second.
There’s a distinction in theory but in practice the vague definition of “sentience” is so tied to moral relevance I don’t think you can argue for one without also arguing for the other.
The question “does a worm feel pain” isn’t really asking “does the worm have nociceptors and some degree of integration of those nociceptive signals that causes learning and behavioural changes”. It’s really asking, at the core, “does a worm ‘feel pain’ in a way that’s morally important”